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Abstract 
 
Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a group of mobile devices that can form a 
network, interconnect and share resources without the use of any fixed network 
infrastructure or centralised management. MANET is exposed to security attacks 
because of its fundamental characteristics such as open medium, dynamic topology 
and lack of central monitoring. The black hole attack is one example of the attacks 
MANET is exposed to. In black hole attack, a malicious node misleadingly claims to 
have an updated route to the destination node, absorbs and drops the packets that 
are supposed to be forwarded to the destination node. 
The common MANET reactive routing protocols are Ad-hoc on-demand Distance 
Vector (AODV) and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR). These protocols are easily 
attacked by the black hole during the route discovery process. This research 
therefore studies black hole attack in detail and assesses the performance of AODV 
and DSR under black hole attack. The work is achieved by simulating the two 
protocols under regular operation and under black hole attack using Network 
Simulator 2 (NS-2). The protocols are analysed using packet delivery ratio, 
throughput and end-to-end delay as performance metrics. The research further 
compares the black hole attack solutions that have been previously proposed and 
determines the solution that performs better than others. 
The simulation results show that MANET under normal operating environment out 
performs MANET attacked by black hole, and that AODV is more vulnerable to black 
hole attack than DSR. The comparison study of the existing black hole attack 
solutions show that SAODV is the best effective black hole attack removal technique. 
But when considering the solution that brings no negative impact to the normal 
operation of the network, IDSAODV is the best solution. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The growing number of light-weight and low-cost mobile devices and advances in 
computer networking has led to increased popularity of Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
(MANETs). A MANET is a group of mobile devices that can form a network, 
interconnect and share resources without the use of any fixed network infrastructure 
or centralised management (Jhaveri et al., 2010). In a MANET, nodes that are in the 
transmission range of each other can forward messages to each other directly. On 
the other hand, nodes that are not in each other’s range have to depend on 
intermediate nodes to communicate. The cooperation of the nodes is important for 
successful communication because each node has to take the role of a router and 
forward packets to neighbouring nodes (Osathanunkul & Zhang, 2011). 
A MANET is suitable to provide communications in many applications, particularly in 
cases where it is not possible to setup a network infrastructure. For instance, in a 
military operation, where there may be geographical barriers between participants, a 
MANET can be set up to facilitate communication. Also because it is easy to set up, 
it may be of assistance to replace the damaged network infrastructure in disaster 
recovery operations where temporary network infrastructure is immediately needed 
(Mishra et al., 2010; Sharma & Sharma, 2012). 
The features of MANET such as limited battery power, open and bandwidth 
constraint channels, changing network topology, dissimilar devices, lack of 
infrastructure and central monitoring cause MANET routing to be challenging 
(Osathanunkul & Zhang, 2011). In order to overcome routing challenges in MANETs 
and attain effective routing, a number of routing protocols are defined specifically for 
MANETs. Examples of these protocols are Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV), Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Destination-Sequenced Distance-
Vector (DSDV). Most of these protocols have been defined with an assumption that 
all nodes in the network can be trusted and are cooperative.  However, if some of the 
nodes become malicious, MANETS become exposed to different kinds of attacks.  
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The routing attacks are more severe because they interrupt routing which is an 
important network service. Black hole attack is one type of routing attacks 
(Kannhavong et al., 2007). 
 
1.2 Motivation 
 
It is highly crucial for both wired and wireless networks to be secured so as to offer 
protected communication. The success of MANET is intensely determined by the 
confidence people have in its security. However, MANET characteristics such as 
open architecture and dynamic topology make it challenging to achieve security 
attributes such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, availability, access control 
and non-repudiation (Wu et al., 2007). Early research on MANET mostly 
concentrated on developing routing mechanisms that are efficient for a dynamic and 
resource constraint MANET. It is therefore crucial that security aspects of MANET 
routing protocols be taken into consideration. This study focuses on black hole attack 
because it is a very dangerous attack that aims to disrupt the routing process of 
MANETs. The effect of black hole attack is tested on reactive routing protocols 
because they are more susceptible to black hole attack due to the fact that they 
establish routes on demand. The black hole attack targets route discovery process 
and can easily attack reactive protocol since they discover the routes frequently. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The black hole attack against MANETs and its detection schemes have been mostly 
studied and analysed using AODV routing protocol in the previous research works. 
AODV is the most widely used protocol for MANETs because of its low control 
message overhead.  Other reactive routing protocols such as DSR have been given 
less attention in the analysis of this attack. It is necessary and important to perform 
analysis of the black hole attack using other protocols so that a comparative analysis 
of its impact on performance of MANETs when using different routing protocols can 
be done. 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this research are as follows; 
1. To analyse the impact of black hole attack in MANETs. 
2. To simulate AODV and DSR under black hole attack using Network Simulator 
2 (NS-2). 
3. To compare performance of AODV and DSR protocols under black hole 
attack. 
4. To make recommendation of the preferred reactive routing protocol under 
black hole attack based on the simulation results analysis. 
5. To compare performance of existing proposed black hole attack solutions. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 
1. What is the impact of black hole attack on performance of MANETs? 
2. Which of the two reactive routing protocols (AODV and DSR) performs better 
under black hole attack? 
3. Which of the existing proposed black hole attack solutions perform best? 
 
1.6 Research Scope and Limitations 
 
Each of the layers in the communication protocols stack of ad-hoc networks has its 
own weaknesses and challenges (Mishra & Sharma et al., 2010), but the study 
focuses only on routing layer attacks because routing is a vital factor in mobile 
network communications. The impact of black hole attack is studied and analysed 
using the two mostly used MANET reactive routing protocols AODV and DSR. In 
carrying out the study, it is assumed that black hole nodes do not coordinate to 
attack and therefore the instance of several black hole nodes working together has 
not been considered.  
Recent deployments of ad-hoc networks indicate a significant presence of 
unidirectional or asymmetric links caused by heterogeneous transmission of mobile 
nodes. Even when nodes are transmitting at the same power, unidirectional links 
may be created due to random fluctuations in signal propagation and presence of 
noise sources near a node. Nevertheless, bidirectional links are assumed when 
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designing routing algorithms because the presence of unidirectional links severely 
affects the functionality of several routing protocols, so it is assumed that there are 
only bidirectional links in the network (Garg & Mahapatra, 2009). 
1.7 Research Methodology 
1.7.1 Approach 
 
Since the primary goal of this study is to achieve the above mentioned objectives 
and find answers to the research questions, the quantitative approach towards the 
study is used. The quantitative approach emphasizes studies that are experimental 
in nature and give some results. These results are analysed and conclusions derived 
from their analysis (Borrego et al., 2009). The work is divided into two models, 
theoretical model and simulation model. Theoretical model involves studying the 
related literature. Simulation model involves configuration of the network using 
simulation software and running of the simulations. The results are then obtained 
from the simulations, analysed and conclusions drawn. Figure 1.1 below illustrates 
the research approach taken in this study. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Research Approach 
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1.7.2 Research Stages 
 
The study is divided into four stages: 
i. Problem identification 
ii. Literature study 
iii. Building simulation 
iv. Results analysis and conclusions 
1.7.2.1 Problem Identification 
 
The identification of a research problem is the first and most important step in the 
research process. The researcher first identified the major research area of her 
interest which is MANETs. After going through most of the literature related to 
MANETs, the researcher narrowed down the area by considering security issues of 
MANETs, and specifically focused on the black hole attacks. 
1.7.2.2 Literature Study 
 
The detailed literature study was carried out to develop a solid background of the 
research. The literature on the black hole attack, AODV and DSR routing protocols 
was studied and the previously proposed black hole attack solutions were studied. 
Different network simulation tools and their functionality were also studied, but more 
focus was put on NS-2 which has been used in this research study. 
1.7.2.3 Building Simulation 
 
Various simulation models using the two protocols (AODV and DSR) in the study 
were developed based on the requirements of the research problem. The knowledge 
acquired from the literature study played an important role in building the 
simulations. 
1.7.2.4 Results analysis and Conclusions 
 
Results obtained from the simulation were analysed using graphs and conclusions 
drawn based on the analysis. 
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1.8 Research Contributions 
 
The contributions of this study are as follows: 
· The significance of discovering the protocol that is more susceptible to black 
hole attack is that more research will be conducted on the vulnerable protocol 
to make it more secure. 
  
· The analysis of the impact of black hole attack contributes to the body of 
knowledge on how severe the attack is. 
 
· A recommendation of the preferred reactive routing protocol under black hole 
attack is done, which can assist researchers intending to realise a good 
network performance in an environment that is attacked by a black hole node. 
 
· The previously proposed black hole solutions have been tested using 
simulations, so this study contributes to the body of knowledge by finding out 
which of these solutions perform better than others.  
 
· The following peer-reviewed conference papers emanated from this research: 
i. Lineo Mejaele and Elisha Oketch Ochola, “AODV vs. DSR: Simulation 
Based Comparison of Ad-hoc Network Reactive Protocols under Black 
Hole Attack”, proceedings of second International Conference on 
Advances in Computing, Electronics and Electrical Technology - CEET 
2014, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 20-21 December, 2014. 
 
§ The same paper “AODV vs. DSR: Simulation Based 
Comparison of Ad-hoc Network Reactive Protocols under Black 
Hole Attack” was also published in the International Journal of 
Advances in Computer Networks and Its Security– IJCNS 
Volume 5: Issue 1 [ISSN: 2250-3757]. Publication date: 30 April 
2015. 
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ii. Lineo Mejaele and Elisha Oketch Ochola, “Analysing the Impact of 
Black Hole Attack on DSR-based MANET: The Hidden Network 
Destructor”, proceedings of second International Conference on 
Information Security and Cyber Forensics – InforSec 2015, Cape 
Town, South Africa, 15-17 November, 2015. 
 
1.9 Outline of Chapters 
 
This dissertation comprises of seven chapters. Figure 1.2 outlines the structure of 
the dissertation. Chapter 1 gives the introduction to the study. The descriptions of 
what subsequent chapters comprise are given below Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Dissertation Structure 
Chapter 2 gives the background study of wireless networks, paying more attention 
on the literature study of MANETs, discussing the characteristics, applications, 
routing protocols of MANETs. It further focuses on the detailed operation of the two 
routing protocols, AODV and DSR which are the centre of this research work. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the security issues of MANETs. It clearly outlines the 
characteristics of MANETs that make them vulnerable to security attacks. It further 
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discusses the security attributes that must be fulfilled by a network for proper 
communication. Then different types of attacks are described in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 presents an in-depth discussion of black hole attack. Firstly, the chapter 
explains the black hole attack in detail, describes different ways in which the attack 
can occur and different types of this attack. Secondly, the chapter describes how 
black hole attack occurs in a network that uses AODV routing protocol and in a 
network that uses DSR routing protocol. The chapter further discusses some of the 
mitigation techniques that have been previously proposed to combat the effects of 
black hole attack which have been tested using AODV. Lastly, the previous work in 
the literature that is similar to this study is discussed. 
Chapter 5 discusses the implementation of the research study. It firstly gives an 
overview of the research objectives, and then describes NS-2, which is the 
simulation software used in this study. The chapter continues to give reasons for the 
choice of simulation software and gives an overview of the NS-2 simulation, then 
gives the simulation parameters used in the setups. Lastly the modifications made to 
C++ code of NS-2 to include a black hole node in the network are illustrated. 
Chapter 6 discusses the simulation results and results obtained from literature, and 
gives analysis of the results. It first describes the output trace file of NS-2, and then 
the scripting language used to filter only the required fields from trace files. It then 
discusses evaluation performance metrics used in this study and thereafter results 
obtained for each metric are presented and analysed. 
Chapter 7 concludes the study, reflecting on research questions presented in 
Section 1.5 and gives some recommendations for future work. 
 
1.10 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the background of the study by describing MANETs, 
their routing protocols and features that expose them to many security attacks. The 
motivation behind carrying out this research work was then described and the 
statement of the problem explained. The chapter further listed the objectives and the 
research questions, and outlined the methodology used to meet the objectives. 
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Moreover, the chapter explained the scope covered by this study and how the study 
contributes to the body of knowledge. Lastly, the outline of subsequent chapters was 
presented. The next chapter gives the description of wireless networks.   
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2  Wireless Networks 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides background literature on wireless networks. It describes 
different types of wireless networks focusing mainly on MANETs. It clearly explains 
characteristics and applications of MANETs, and further describes routing in 
MANETs, outlining different MANET routing protocols based on their classification 
and explaining the protocols’ route discovery and maintenance mechanisms.  
2.2 Related Background 
 
“The era of wireless communication began at the end of the 19th century with the 
first successful wireless radio transmission performed by an American scientist 
of Serbian origin Nikola Tesla in 1893” (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012: 1). Wireless 
networks are computer networks that are not connected by cables of any kind. Radio 
waves are the foundation of wireless systems. The advantages of wireless 
communication are smaller demands for infrastructure equipment, reduced average 
cost, shorter time for establishing the connection and increased user mobility. 
2.2.1 Types of Wireless Networks 
 
There exist two types of mobile wireless networks. The first type is the 
infrastructure network which has wired and fixed gateways. The common 
applications of this type of network include wireless local area networks (WLANs) 
and cellular networks. The second type is the infrastructure-less mobile network, 
normally referred to as an ad-hoc network. The nodes in infrastructure-less networks 
move freely and can be connected randomly because there are no gateways and 
routers monitoring the nodes. Ad-hoc network can be classified into Static Ad-hoc 
Network (SANET) and Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET). Examples of SANET are 
sensor networks and Mesh networks (Al-Omari & Sumari, 2010) . Figure 2.1 shows a 
schematic overview of wireless networks. 
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Figure 2.1 : Schematic Overview of Wireless Networks 
2.2.1.1 Infrastructure Wireless Networks 
 
This is the network design that allows the wireless stations to communicate with 
each other (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012). The bridges for these networks are 
referred to as base stations and this network relies on fixed base stations. The base 
station regulates the allocation of radio resources. For two mobile nodes to 
communicate, they must both be within the transmission range of the base station. A 
sending node does not have to know the route to a destination node; it just notifies 
the base station of its intention to communicate with a particular destination node. 
The base station then forwards the messages from source node to destination node 
because it knows all the routes. If any node can move out of range of one base 
station into the range of another base station, a signal transmission of that node is 
transited to the new base station and a mobile node continues to communicate 
throughout the network (Al-Omari & Sumari, 2010). 
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2.2.2.2 Infrastructure-less Wireless Networks (Ad-hoc Networks) 
 
Infrastructure-less wireless network is a group of two or more devices that have the 
capability to connect and communicate without any central monitoring, or any 
network infrastructure. Examples of applications of ad-hoc networks are emergency 
search-and-rescue operations, meetings or conventions in which persons wish to 
quickly share information, and data acquisition operations in hospitable terrain (Al-
Omari & Sumari, 2010). 
1. Static Ad-hoc Networks 
In static ad-hoc networks, the physical position of the nodes or the stations is 
stationary. The nodes in the network are not moving, hence these ad-hoc 
networks are referred to as static (Zhang et al., 2009). 
2. Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
In mobile ad-hoc network, the entire network may be mobile. The nodes are at 
liberty to join or leave the network freely because there is no constraint on the 
movement of the nodes.  The topology of mobile ad-hoc network can change fast 
because the nodes are at liberty to move and can arbitrarily arrange themselves. 
Figure 2.2 shows some nodes forming ad-hoc networks, and illustrates the nodes 
moving randomly in different directions and different speeds (Al-Omari & Sumari, 
2010). 
 
Figure 2.2: Nodes Forming Ad-hoc Network 
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2.3 Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
 
MANET is a group of mobile devices that can spontaneously interconnect and share 
resources via wireless communication channels, with no fixed network infrastructure 
or centralised management. MANETs can be assembled rapidly and at low cost 
because they do not require central monitoring or fixed network infrastructure 
(Osathanunkul & Zhang, 2011). In MANET, the nodes move arbitrarily in different 
directions and speeds, hence the dynamic topology (de Oliveira Schmidt & Trentin, 
2008; Thachil & Shet, 2012). The proper functioning of MANETs depends on the 
mutual agreement and understanding between the nodes because there are no 
devices dedicated to monitor communication between the nodes. The nodes that are 
in the transmission range of each other can forward messages to each other directly; 
otherwise the packets have to be forwarded via intermediate nodes to the destination 
node (Wu et al., 2007). Every mobile node has to take the role of a router in order to 
forward packets for other nodes (Stojanovic et al., 2012).  
Mobile nodes in MANET do not necessarily have to be of the same type. They can 
be PDAs, laptops, mobile phones, routers, printers, etc. as illustrated by Figure 2.3. 
The nodes are equipped with antennas which operate as wireless transmitters and 
receivers. The antennas may be omnidirectional, highly directional or a combination. 
The mobile nodes are resource constraint in terms of bandwidth and battery power 
(Wu et al., 2007; Rajabhushanam & Kathirvel, 2011).  
 
Figure 2.3: Mobile Ad-hoc Network 
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Figure 2.4 illustrates transmission ranges in MANET. The range of each node’s radio 
transceiver is specified by the circles. An example of three mobile nodes 
participating in a network is demonstrated by Figure 2.4. Since the outer most 
laptops are not in the transmission range of each other, the middle PDA can take the 
role of a router and forward the packets between the outer most nodes.  
 
Figure 2.4: Illustration of transmission ranges 
 
There are three types of MANETs which are Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs), 
Intelligent Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (InVANETs) and Internet Based Mobile Ad-
hoc Networks (iMANET) (Al-Omari & Sumari, 2010). 
2.4 Applications of MANETs 
 
Ad-hoc networking is becoming significant in many applications due to the 
advancement in wireless communication and the increasing number of portable 
devices. MANETs can be deployed in areas where it is not possible to set up the 
network infrastructure or temporary network connectivity is needed. MANET can find 
applications in different set of networks, stretching from large-scale, mobile, highly 
dynamic networks, to small, static networks that are constrained by power sources 
(Goyal et al., 2011). The common applications consist of military battlefield, disaster 
relief, temporary networks and vehicular networks as explained in Section 2.4.1, 
Section 2.4.2, Section 2.4.3 and Section 2.4.4 respectively. 
 
2.4.1 Military Battlefield 
 
Currently the military equipment has some computer wireless cards, so they can 
form a MANET and communicate with each other in the battlefield. MANETs help to 
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maintain information network between the soldiers, vehicles, and military information 
headquarters, therefore there will not be any geographical obstacles in a military 
action (Wu et al., 2007). 
2.4.2 Disaster Relief 
 
MANET can be used to setup a quick network in emergency situations where the 
network infrastructure has been destroyed and there is a need for an instant short 
term network. The causes for damage to network infrastructure could be fire, 
earthquakes, and floods. In the case where the damaged communication network is 
rapidly needed, emergency rescue operations must take place, and rescue team 
members utilise small hand held devices to pass information amongst themselves 
(Goyal et al., 2011).   
2.4.3 Temporary Networks 
 
Nowadays, mobile devices such as laptops, notebooks, and tablets are used by 
individuals in meetings, conferences and classrooms. A network is required in order 
for the participants to share information, so MANET can assist in forming a 
temporary network (Thakare & Joshi, 2010). 
 
2.4.4 Vehicular networks 
 
Most vehicles today are equipped with short range radios that enable them to 
communicate with other vehicles, so the vehicles can form a MANET. The vehicles 
in MANET would communicate accident warning to the drivers (Rajesh & Anil, 2012). 
 
2.5 Routing in MANETs 
 
The topology of MANETs keeps changing rapidly due to free movement of nodes 
joining and leaving the network any time. Routing is important in order to discover 
the recent topology so that an updated route to a certain node can be established 
and a message relayed to the correct destination (Kannhavong et al., 2007; 
Rajabhushanam & Kathirvel, 2011).  
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End-to-end communication between the nodes is established through the use of 
traditional TCP/IP structure.  However due to mobility and limited resources, each 
layer in the TCP/IP model needs to be  redefined or altered in order to operate 
efficiently in MANETs. This makes it very challenging to design an efficient and 
reliable routing plan for MANETs (Abolhasan et al., 2004) .  
The traditional routing protocols that have been structured for hard wired networks, 
such as distance vector and link state protocols cannot be applied in MANETs 
directly. This is because mobility and dynamic topology are the fundamental 
characteristics of MANETs (Sharma & Sharma, 2012). Therefore, in order to 
overcome routing challenges in MANETs and attain effective routing, a number of 
routing protocols are defined specifically for MANETs. 
 
2.6 Classification of MANET Routing Protocols 
 
MANETs routing protocols can be categorised into proactive, reactive and hybrid 
protocols based on how the nodes establish and maintain paths (Giruka & Singhal, 
2007).  The hierarchy of these protocols is shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
. 
Figure 2.5: Hierarchy of MANET Routing Protocols 
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2.6.1 Proactive Protocols 
These are table-driven routing protocols that try to keep a record of fresh and 
updated network routes.  Every node in the network keeps a table to store the 
routing information (Goyal et al., 2011). In order to maintain a consistent network 
view, the nodes exchange topology information. The exchanged information helps to 
reflect any changes in the topology.  Every time a node wants to send messages, it 
could obtain a path to the destination through searching local route table, without 
delay of remote route discovery (Kannhavong et al., 2007). Maintaining an up-to-
date topology in the routing tables causes a high control overhead. Examples of 
popular proactive routing protocols are Destination-sequenced Distance- Vector 
routing protocol (DSDV), and Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) 
(Thakare & Joshi, 2010). 
 
2.6.2 Reactive Protocols 
 
Reactive protocols as explained by Johnsort (1994) are on demand routing 
protocols. As the name suggests, the routes to destination are established only when 
the nodes must send data to destination whose route is unknown. This implies that 
the source node initiates the searching of routing paths only when needed. When a 
node wants to send data to a destination node, it starts a route discovery process 
within the network. Comparative to proactive protocols, the control overhead in 
reactive protocols is reduced; however the route searching process that occurs 
before data packets can be forwarded may cause source node to suffer long delays. 
Examples of popular reactive protocols are Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) and Ad-
hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) (Thakare & Joshi, 2010).   
2.6.3 Hybrid Protocols 
 
Hybrid protocols are a combination of proactive and reactive protocols. Their design 
merges the advantages of both proactive and reactive protocols to yield better 
results (Singh & Sharma, 2012). The majority of hybrid routing protocols are 
structured using a hierarchical or layered network model.  
Firstly, proactive routing is used to fully acquire all the routing information that is 
unknown. Then reactive routing mechanisms are used to maintain the routing 
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information when network topology changes. The common hybrid routing protocols 
are zone routing protocol (ZRP) and temporally ordered routing algorithm (TORA) 
(Tseng et al., 2011). 
 
2.7 Description of Popular Ad-hoc Routing Protocols 
 
This section describes the operation of the most popularly used protocols under the 
three categories explained in Section 2.6. Since the research focuses on the 
performance of the two reactive protocols, DSR and AODV are discussed in detail in 
Section 2.7.5 and Section 2.7.6 respectively. Other routing protocols are briefly 
described.  
2.7.1 Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing Protocol (DSDV) 
 
DSDV as explained by Perkins and Bhagwat (1994) is a table-driven protocol for 
MANET which was invented to solve the routing loop problem. A routing table that 
shows route information to other nodes in the network is kept in each node. The 
routing table is updated periodically to provide a fresh view of the whole network. 
The fundamental issue is the creation and maintenance of tables; the routing 
updates must be transmitted regularly to keep the tables updated, this has to happen 
even when traffic of packets is congested. DSDV operates only when the routing 
updates about changes in topology have reached all the nodes in the network.  
This protocol is inefficient because as the network grows, the overhead also grows. 
However, when the ad-hoc network has a small number of mobile nodes with few 
changes in network topology, DSDV becomes more effective (Jhaveri et al., 2010). 
 
2.7.2 Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) 
 
OLSR is described by Jacquet et al. (2001) as a proactive link state routing protocol 
for MANETs.  The routing table that reflects routing information to every node in the 
network is kept by each node. The periodic updates that maintain topology 
information about the network are done by exchanging link-state messages. Thus 
the routes can be obtained immediately when required. Whenever there is a change 
in the topology of the network, the topological information gets flooded to all 
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available nodes. So the basic idea behind the design of this protocol is to cut the 
number of broadcast messages in comparison to other pure flooding mechanisms, 
and thereby decrease control overhead. OLSR uses multipoint relays (MPRs) to 
support this idea (Kuppusamy et al., 2011). During each update of the topology, 
each node in the network chooses a group of nearby nodes that will retransmit its 
packets. This group of nodes is referred to as the multipoint relays of that node. All 
other nodes which are not part of the group can read and process each packet but 
do not retransmit the packet. In the selection of the MPRs, each node broadcasts a 
list of its one hop neighbours periodically using hello messages. The information 
about own advertised neighbours is broadcast using topology control (TC) 
messages. This protocol is mostly suitable for huge and dense networks (Abolhasan 
et al., 2004). 
2.7.3 Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
 
ZRP is an example of a hybrid routing protocol. It proficiently combines the features 
of proactive and reactive protocols. The network is divided into local neighbourhoods 
known as zones, and uses different protocols in different zones (Thakare & Joshi 
2010). The proactive mechanisms are used to maintain routing information for the 
routing zone, so the control overhead is minimised. The route to destinations beyond 
the routing zone is obtained using reactive mechanisms; therefore the flooding 
drawbacks are reduced. In the operation of ZRP, the local routing information is 
checked regularly; therefore the waste related to pure proactive schemes is reduced 
(Pervaiz et al., 2010). 
2.7.4 Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) 
 
TORA is a routing protocol suitable for multi hop networks and it is also referred to 
as a link reversal protocol (Gill & Kunwar, 2014).  The nodes in the network only 
keep information about their neighbours because TORA is a distributed algorithm. It 
utilises a combination of reactive and proactive routing. The route requests are 
started by the source node using reactive routing. Concurrently the designated 
destination nodes may start building traditional routing tables by using proactive 
operation (Kuppusamy et al., 2011). 
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The three basic functions performed by the protocol are; route discovery, route 
maintenance and route erasure.  The route discovery process is started only when a 
node has no route to destination and needs a route. Route maintenance is important 
for re-establishing a route to destination node; this happens if the node has learnt 
that a route to destination no longer exists. Route erasure is used when there is a 
partition in the network; the protocol is capable of detecting the partition and erasing 
all routes that are not valid. The topological alterations do not call for any reaction 
because TORA has a unique feature of maintaining several routes to destination. 
The protocol reacts only when all routes to the destination are lost (Gill & Kunwar, 
2014). 
 
2.7.5 Dynamic Source Routing Protocol (DSR) 
 
DSR is described by Johnson & Maltz (1996) as a reactive routing protocol that is 
founded on the idea of source routing. Source routing requires that all the details of 
the discovered route to the destination should always be known by the source node 
(Jhaveri et al., 2010). Every mobile node has a route cache that stores entries of 
routes that are known by the mobile node, and these entries are updated constantly 
whenever there is new routing information (Mbarushimana & Shahrabi, 2007). DSR 
routing is loop-free because each node can have multiple routes to one destination. 
Therefore, it is most preferred in larger networks with rapidly changing routes and 
high mobility rate of nodes (Jhaveri et al., 2010). DSR uses route discovery and 
route maintenance processes as explained in Section 2.6.5.1 and Section 2.6.5.2 
respectively. 
 
2.6.5.1 DSR Route Discovery 
 
A node that requires forwarding data packet to some destination node starts by 
looking into its route cache to check if a route to that destination already exists. If it 
exists in the cache and has not expired, then it is used to transmit the packet to the 
destination node. On the contrary, if there is no such route, route discovery process 
is started by broadcasting the route request (RREQ) packet that encloses the 
destination node address, the source node address, and a distinctive identification 
number (Mbarushimana & Shahrabi, 2007). 
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When the route request is received by a node in the network, and the node is not a 
destination node or does not have a route to the destination, it adds its own address 
to the route record of the packet and broadcasts the packet again (Mbarushimana & 
Shahrabi, 2007). When the RREQ message is received by an intermediate node that 
has no route to the destination, it modifies the route record by adding its own 
address and rebroadcasts the packet to neighbouring nodes. The RREQ is only 
processed by the node if it has never seen it, and this helps to reduce the number of 
RREQs (Giruka & Singhal, 2007). 
When the RREQ message reaches either the destination node or an intermediate 
node which contains a fresh route to destination in its cache, a route reply (RREP) 
packet is created and sent to the source node. The source node starts forwarding 
messages to the destination immediately after it has received RREP packet (Giruka 
& Singhal, 2007). The sequence numbers are used to determine whether the route is 
fresh or not. The route is considered to be fresh enough if the sequence number of 
the destination node is greater than RREQ packet sequence number (Mahmood & 
Khan, 2007). 
 
2.6.6.2 DSR Route Maintenance 
 
There are no periodic HELLO messages, so each node is liable to verify that the 
next hop node receives the packets forwarded to it. If a node does not receive a 
receipt confirmation from the next hop node, then the link is broken and the node 
that originated the route is informed about the broken link by forwarding a route error 
(RERR) message to it. A new route discovery has to be done, or another existing 
route can be used to send the packet (Zhou, 2003; Mbarushimana & Shahrabi, 
2007). 
 
2.7.6 Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector Routing Protocol (AODV) 
 
AODV is a routing protocol that establishes a route from source to destination on 
demand (Dokurer et al., 2007). Amongst all MANET routing protocols, AODV is the 
most popular protocol and it is based on DSDV and DSR algorithms (Jhaveri et al., 
2010). The notion of destination sequence number borrowed from DSDV is used to 
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keep record of the updated topology information between the nodes. AODV ensures 
a loop free routing because of the sequence numbers. 
Unlike DSDV, the sequence number in AODV increases and works as a time stamp 
to allow a node to compare how fresh the information is. AODV is an enhancement 
of DSDV because instead of maintaining a complete list of routes, it generates the 
routes on demand and thereby decreases the number of required broadcasts (Royer 
& Toh, 1999). Similar to DSR, the nodes learn routes by broadcasting route request 
messages.  
Each node does not keep a complete route from source to destination, instead route 
table entries are dynamically established at intermediate nodes. The combination of 
these techniques yields an algorithm that uses bandwidth efficiently, and is 
responsive to changes in topology (Perkins & Royer, 1999). 
 
2.7.6.1 AODV Route Discovery 
 
Route discovery process is a cycle that involves a broadcast network search and a 
unicast reply that consists of paths that have been discovered (Agrawal et al., 
2011). All the nodes in the network keep a record in a table of information about 
neighbouring nodes that can forward the packets so that they reach the destination, 
and hello messages are broadcast periodically to keep track of neighbouring nodes. 
When a source node wants to send data packets to a destination node, and there is 
no routing information regarding the destination node in the routing table, the source 
node initiates a route discovery process (Jhaveri et al., 2010). In discovering the 
route, a source node broadcasts route request (RREQ) packet that comprises of  
RREQ ID, destination IP address, destination sequence number, source IP address, 
source sequence number and hop count (Purohit  et al., 2011). 
Every node that obtains the RREQ packet first checks the destination IP address to 
determine whether it is the destination for the packet, and if so, it sends back route 
reply (RREP) packet. If it is not the destination, it looks into its routing table to find if 
it has a fresh enough route to destination, and if not it broadcasts the RREQ packet 
to nearby nodes. If there is a route to destination in its routing table, a node 
compares a RREQ packet sequence number with the destination sequence number 
in the table to find if the route is updated. The route in the routing table is considered 
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fresh and updated if the destination sequence number in the table is higher than the 
sequence number attached to the RREQ packet. The intermediate node with an 
updated route uses the opposite route to send a unicast RREP packet to the source 
node, and once the source node has received a RREP packet, it begins to send data 
packets through this route. If the route in the table is not fresh enough, the node 
further sends the RREQ packet to its neighbours (Medadian et al, 2009; Jhaveri, et 
al., 2010). 
2.7.6.2 AODV Route Maintenance 
 
During operation, a route error (RERR) packet is sent by a node that detects a 
broken link. A RERR packet is relayed to every node that utilises the affected link for 
their communication to other nodes (Medadian, et al., 2009). Figure 2.6 illustrates 
how AODV route maintenance occurs. 
 
Figure 2.6: AODV Route Maintenance 
An example of six mobile nodes is considered in the illustration. The transmission 
range for the nodes is designated by the circles. Each node can only communicate 
directly with nearby nodes because the communication range is constricted. If a 
node wants to communicate with a node that is outside the transmission range, it 
must start a route discovery process to establish a route. 
For example, if Node D wants to transmit data packets to Node C, it establishes a 
route by starting a route discovery process. Once the route is established, (Node D – 
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Node A- Node B - Node C), node D sends the data packet through the specified 
route. 
As shown in Figure 2.6, if Node A leaves the network, Node F which is in the 
communication range of Node A and Node B will not get a HELLO message from 
Node A, and that is how node F discovers that Node A has moved. The route 
through Node A is then marked as invalid by Node F and a RERR message is 
transmitted to Node B to notify it that Node A is not a neighbour anymore.  
2.7.7 Reactive Routing Protocols Route Discovery Illustration 
 
Figure 2.7 and Figure 2.8 illustrate route discovery process in reactive routing 
protocols. In Figure 2.7, the source node 1 broadcast a RREQ message because it 
wants to send data packets to destination node 8. The intermediate nodes 2, 3, 4 
receive RREQ message and propagate it further to their neighbours until the RREQ 
message reaches  the actual destination node or the intermediate node that has 
updated route to the destination (Dokurer, Ert et al. 2007).  
Upon receiving the RREQ, the destination node or an intermediate node that has a 
fresh enough route to the destination unicasts a RREP packet to source node as 
shown in Figure 2.8. Figure 2.9 summarizes route discovery process in AODV and 
DSR by using a flow diagram. 
 
Figure 2.7: Broadcast of RREQ 
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Figure 2.8: Unicast of RREP to the source 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Route Discovery Flow Chart 
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2.8 Wireless Ad-hoc Network Technologies 
 
The wireless technology is presently governed by the two standards, namely the 
Bluetooth and the IEEE 802.11 protocols. These standards are designed to manage 
wireless communications between devices that consume less power and are within 
limited transmission range (from a few up to several hundred meters). Bluetooth 
mainly replaces data transfer cables in communications between closely connected 
devices while IEEE 802.11 is focused on replacing cabled LANs formed by 
computers connected together (Ferro & Potorti, 2005).  
 
2.8.1 Bluetooth 
 
Bluetooth standard which is sometimes referred to as the IEEE 802.15.1 standard 
uses wireless radio communication. It is intended to provide wireless connectivity 
between short-range and cheap devices in order to substitute data transfer cables 
for computer peripherals such as keyboards, mice and printers. This range of 
applications is known as wireless personal area network (WPAN) (Lee et al., 2007). 
When Bluetooth is activated on a device, the device functions as a slave device and 
waits for a master device to make an inquiry. The enquiry phase enables the master 
device to realise nodes in its range and their addresses. For simple paired devices 
that already have each other’s addresses, the enquiry phase is not needed.  As soon 
as the master has learnt the address of the slave, it establishes a connection if a 
slave is ready for connection. The stage for starting a connection is called the paging 
phase. This paging phase leads to synchronization of the devices over the frequency 
hopping sequence. The frequency hopping sequence ensures that more than one 
device cannot transmit on the same frequency simultaneously (Ferro & Potorti, 2005) 
.  
2.8.2 IEEE 802.11 
 
The purpose of IEEE 802.11 standard is to allow wireless communication between 
mobile, portable devices such as PDAs, notebooks when they require a speedy 
connection (Ferro & Potorti, 2005). When a device that has capability to use Wi-Fi is 
switched on, it starts scanning to find nearby available networks that have signals. It 
then chooses a network to join, either infrastructure or ad-hoc (Lee, et al., 2007).  
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 In the case of infrastructure network where there is an access point, the device gets 
authenticated and connects with the access point (Ferro & Potorti, 2005). 
 
2.9 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed literature on wireless networks, describing the different 
types of wireless networks and wireless network technologies. It mainly concentrated 
on MANET which is a group of mobile devices that can form a network, interconnect 
and share resources without the use of any fixed network infrastructure or 
centralised management. It further explained how MANET can find applications in 
areas such as military services, disaster recovery and conferences where the 
network infrastructure is not feasible.  
Due to the high mobility and dynamic topology of MANETs, routing becomes very 
challenging. This chapter described the routing protocols for MANETs. It first 
described their classification based on how nodes establish and maintain paths, and 
then discussed each individual protocol in detail. Lastly the technologies behind 
wireless networking were discussed. The next chapter discusses the security issues 
in MANETs.
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3  Security Issues in MANETs 
3.1 Introduction 
 
MANETs are exposed to many security attacks due to their salient characteristics 
such as dynamic topology, resource constraint, limited physical security and lack of 
infrastructure. Since MANETs use wireless links to transmit data packets, and the 
wireless links are vulnerable to attacks, the security problem is more severe. It is 
quite challenging to maintain security in MANETs than in wired networks because 
MANETs have far more vulnerabilities (Rajesh & Anil, 2012). This chapter discusses 
the various vulnerabilities that exist in MANETs, explains security goals that must be 
achieved for proper communication and lastly briefly explains the attacks against 
MANETs classified according to layer of occurrence in the protocol stack. 
3.2 Vulnerabilities of MANETs 
 
3.2.1 Lack of Secure Boundaries 
 
The nodes in MANET are at liberty to move inside the network, join and leave the 
network any time. This makes it challenging to establish a security wall as compared 
to traditional wired networks that have a clear line of defence. In order to attack wired 
networks the adversaries must physically enter into the network medium, pass 
through firewalls and gateways before they have access to practice malicious 
behaviour to the target nodes in the network. However, in MANET the adversary can 
communicate with nodes within its transmission range, and become part of the 
network without any physical access to the network. The absence of secure 
boundaries causes MANET to be attacked at any time by any malicious node that is 
within the transmission range of any node in the network (Zaiba, 2011). 
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3.2.2 Threads from Compromised Nodes in the Network 
 
Each mobile node operates independently, which means it is free to join or leave the 
network at any time. This makes it difficult for the nodes to set rules and strategies 
that can prevent malicious behaviour of other nodes in the mobile network. Also due 
to freedom of movement of the nodes in ad-hoc network, a compromised node can 
target different nodes in the network. Hence it becomes quite challenging to identify 
malicious actions of a compromised node in the network, more especially in a large 
network. Therefore, internal attacks from compromised nodes are more dangerous 
than external attacks because they are not easily identified due to the fact that a 
compromised node operated normally before it could be compromised (Zaiba, 2011). 
 
3.2.3 Lack of Centralised Management Facility 
 
There is no central equipment such as a server for monitoring the nodes in the 
network and this increases the vulnerability problems of MANETs. Firstly, it becomes 
very difficult to detect the attacks when there is no central control because the traffic 
in an ad-hoc network is very dynamic (Goyal et al., 2011). Secondly, lack of 
centralised management delays trust management for the nodes in ad-hoc network. 
It is not practical to perform a prior classification because no security association can 
be assumed for all network nodes. As a result, the usual practice of establishing a 
line of defence which distinguishes nodes as trusted and non-trusted cannot be 
achieved. Thirdly, lack of centralised authority can sometimes lead to decentralised 
decision-making. In MANETs, important algorithms rely on the cooperative 
participation of all nodes, so the adversary can make use of this vulnerability and 
perform attacks that can break cooperative algorithms (Singh et al., 2014).  
 
3.2.4 Restricted Power Supply 
 
Mobile devices in MANET get energy from batteries or other exhaustible means, so 
their energy is limited. This energy restriction can cause denial of service by the 
attacker; since the attacker is aware of the battery restriction, it can endlessly 
forward packets to the target node or make the target node to be involved in some 
time consuming activities. This causes battery power to be exhausted and the target 
node will be out of service. Again, the limited power supply may cause a node in 
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MANET to behave selfishly by not participating cooperatively in the network activities 
as a way to safe its limited battery. This becomes a problem particularly when it is 
essential for the node to cooperate with other nodes (Li & Joshi, 2008). 
 
3.2.5 Scalability 
 
Due to mobility of nodes, scalability is a challenge in MANET. Unlike traditional wired 
networks with a scale that is predefined during design, the scale of MANET keeps 
changing all the time. It is quite challenging to predict the number of nodes that will 
be there in future and as a result, protocols and services applied to MANET such as 
routing should be compatible to the changing scale of MANET (Zaiba, 2011). 
 
3.3 Security Goals 
 
Security is the mixture of systems, processes and procedures that are used to make 
sure that access and usage control, availability, authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, 
and non-repudiation are fulfilled for proper communication (Mladenović & Jovanović, 
2012). 
 
3.3.1 Access and Usage Control 
 
Access control is a way of avoiding unauthorised access and usage of network 
resources and systems (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012). Access control ensures that 
access to information is controlled by ad-hoc networks. Usage control makes sure 
that information resource is used correctly by the authorised nodes that have 
corresponding rights. This mechanism provides the ability to control information after 
it is transmitted (Yan, 2002). 
3.3.2 Availability 
 
Availability ensures that all the nodes in the network offer the designed services 
irrespective of the security state. If there is a route to a mobile node, then it should 
be accessible to all nodes that need to use it. The common attack that affects 
availability is Denial of Service attack (DoS). In DoS attack, a selfish node may put a 
larger number of junk packets into the network and thereby cause other network 
services to be unavailable. These junk packets exhaust a huge portion of resources 
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in the network and cause a performance degradation of wireless channels and the 
network as a whole (Li & Joshi, 2008). The DoS attack can cause physical jamming, 
disrupt routing protocol, disconnect the network and bring down high level services 
such as key management service. Routing table overflow attack and sleep 
deprivation attack are two examples of DoS attacks. In routing table overflow attack, 
routes to non-existent nodes are generated by the attacker. The goal of sleep 
deprivation attack is to exhaust the batteries of a victim node (Jawandhiya et al, 
2010).  
3.3.3 Authenticity  
 
Authenticity guarantees that nodes taking part in a communication are genuine and 
not impersonators. It requires that the peer nodes communicating must have 
identities of each other. When there is no authentication required, an adversary 
could pretend to be another node, unlawfully access network resources and 
sensitive information and disturb the operation of other nodes (Zhou, 2003). In 
infrastructure wireless networks, a central monitoring device such as base station or 
access point can manage the authentication of the nodes, but there is no central 
administration in MANET so the authentication requirement is mostly met through 
routing protocols and inbuilt access control mechanisms (Mladenović & Jovanović, 
2012). 
3.3.4 Confidentiality 
 
Confidentiality guarantees that private information is not accessible to unauthorised 
entities. Confidentiality must be a priority when information that is being transmitted 
in the network is sensitive. If such sensitive information can leak to enemies, they 
can use it against the network, and cause overwhelming consequences (Zaiba, 
2011). It is challenging to preserve confidentiality in MANETs because MANETs use 
open medium, and all nodes can access information that is within their transmission 
range. Confidentiality is fulfilled mainly by using encryption methods, or alternatively 
using directional antennas to limit the emission of data (Mladenović & Jovanović, 
2012). 
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3.3.5 Integrity  
 
Integrity represents the ability to prevent an unauthorised change or destruction of 
messages being transmitted within MANET, as well as prevent subsequent 
messages from the attacker after the unauthorised change. Interception and change 
of data in a wireless medium is very frequent. Integrity guarantees that message 
received at the destination is exactly identical to the same message when it was sent 
at the source. There are two ways that can mainly compromise the integrity of 
messages. 
i. An adversary can intentionally destruct the message by editing, replaying or 
deleting with a malicious goal.   
ii. Some transmission errors in communication or hardware error can 
unintentionally cause the message to be lost or its contents to be altered (Li & 
Joshi, 2008). 
3.3.6 Non-repudiation 
 
Non-repudiation makes sure that the source of a message has no way of denying 
that it has sent the message. This helps to determine whether a node that behaves 
abnormally has been compromised or not. Any node that receives a message with 
errors from a misbehaving node can use that incorrect message as evidence to 
inform other nodes about the compromised node, and the node sending improper 
message will not deny having sent the message (Li & Joshi, 2008). 
   
3.4 Classification of attacks 
 
Attacks against MANET can be categorised into passive attacks and active 
attacks based on behaviour of the attack (Vani & Rao, 2011). They can also be 
categorised as internal and external based on the location of attacks (Saini & 
Kumar, 2010) . Some attacks are classified according to the layer of occurrence in 
the protocol stack (Pavani &Avula, 2012). The attacks can also be classified into 
modification attack, impersonation attack and fabrication attack based on the 
technique used (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012). Figure 3.1 below shows such 
categorization. 
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Figure 3.1: Classification of Attacks 
3.4.1 Passive attacks 
 
The normal operation of the network is not disturbed by a passive attack. A passive 
attacker eavesdrops to steal valuable information, or discards the received message 
silently (Wu et al., 2007). If an attacker can interpret the gathered data, then 
confidentiality will be compromised. Since the network continues to operate normally 
despite the attack, it is very difficult to detect this type of attack. The transmitted 
messages can be encrypted to make it difficult for eavesdroppers to interpret 
overhead data. Snooping is an example of passive attack (Rai et al., 2010). 
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Figure 3.2: Passive Attack 
3.4.1.1 Snooping 
 
Snooping is accessing someone’s data without approval. The simple form of 
snooping includes watching what is displayed on someone’s computer screen and 
viewing what is being typed or reading someone’s email. Software programs are 
used to perform complicated snooping that involves remotely monitoring all activities 
on a network device computer (Rai et al., 2010). 
3.4.2 Active attacks 
 
Active attacks disrupt the normal operation of the network. This is achieved by 
destroying or modifying data transmitted in the network (Rai et al., 2010).The attack 
can generate fabricated messages or alter the contents of messages (Wu et al., 
2007). Active attacks can be internal or external. The examples of active attacks are 
modification, jamming, impersonation, fabrication, black hole attack, wormhole 
attack, resource consumption, and routing attacks (Kumar & Rishi, 2010). 
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Figure 3.3: Active Attack 
 
 3.4.3 External attacks 
 
An attack that is caused by nodes outside the network is an external attack. The 
encryption mechanisms and firewalls can be used to prevent external attacks 
(Jhaveri et al., 2010). External attacks can be orchestrated in different ways like 
impersonation and Denial of Service (Alani, 2014). 
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Figure 3.4: External Attack 
 
3.4.4 Internal attacks 
 
The hijacked or compromised nodes that are within a network launch internal 
attacks. Since the attackers are authorised members of the network, internal attacks 
are not easily detected and as such they are very dangerous (Giruka & Singhal, 
2007). Mostly, the active attacks are launched from inside the network (internal) and 
do the most damage (El-Mousa & Suyyagh, 2010). The examples of internal attacks 
are routing attacks, wormhole attack and eavesdropping (Alani, 2014).  
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Figure 3.5: Internal Attack 
 
3.4.5 Security attacks on protocol stack 
 
Each layer in MANET communication has its own vulnerabilities, therefore attacks 
can also be classified according to the layer of occurrence as shown in Table 1 
(Pavani & Avula, 2012); 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Security Issues in MANETs 
 
38 
 
Table 1: Security Attacks on Protocol Stack 
Layer Attack Examples 
Network Layer Byzantine, Black hole, Wormhole, Resource Consumption, Gray 
hole, Routing attack 
Transport 
Layer 
Session hijacking, SYN Flooding 
Application 
Layer 
Repudiation,  
Multi- Layer Denial of Service (DoS), Impersonation 
 
3.4.5.1 Network layer attacks 
 
Standard routing protocols in MANETs such as DSR and AODV were designed 
without considering any security constraints in MANETs.  Routing happens at the 
network layer and several types of attacks on network layer are described in Section 
3.4.5.1. 
3.4.5.1.1 Byzantine attack 
 
Byzantine attack occurs when a group of compromised intermediate nodes 
collaborate and launch attacks such as generating routing loops, transmitting 
packets through non-optimal paths, or selectively dropping packets. These attacks 
can cause routing services to be disrupted or degraded (Wu et al., 2007). These 
kinds of attacks are not easily detected because the network appears to be operating 
normally in the eyes of the user. Byzantine attacks are classified into black hole 
attack, wormhole attack, and flood rushing attack based on the number of nodes 
attacking the network and the method used to attack the network (Sivakami & 
Nawaz, 2015). Black hole attack and wormhole attack are described in Section 
3.4.5.1.2 and Section 3.4.5.1.3 respectively. The flood rushing attack is described in 
Section 3.4.5.1.6. 
3.4.5.1.2 Black hole attack 
 
The adversary attacks the network by claiming to have the shortest route to a target 
node whose packets it wants to interrupt. It then attracts all packets destined to a 
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target node to itself, and then drops them (Pavani & Avula, 2012). Since this attack is 
the main focus of this research, its detailed description is given in Chapter 4.  
3.4.5.1.3 Wormhole attack 
 
Pair of malicious nodes works together to channel data packets received in one part 
of the network into a low latency tunnel and replays them in a different part. This is 
one of the severe attacks because it can disrupt all communications that ensure 
authenticity and confidentiality. Tunnelling routing control messages can disturb 
routing services.  This tunnel between two scheming attackers is called a wormhole 
(Patel & Sharma, 2013). 
 
Figure 3.6: Example of Wormhole Attack (Kannhavong et al., 2007) 
 
Figure 3.6 illustrates how a wormhole attack can occur against a reactive routing 
protocol.  Suppose node A1 and node A2 in Figure 3.6 are two attackers that are 
scheming together to attack target node S. Node S wants to send data packets to 
destination node D, so it initiates a route discovery process by broadcasting the 
RREQ message. This RREQ is received by S’s neighbours J and K and they forward 
the RREQ as usual. However, when node A1 receives the RREQ from node J, it 
records and channels the RREQ to its partner A2. Node A2 then broadcasts the 
RREQ again to its neighbour N. This RREQ reaches the destination node D first 
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because the tunnel created by the attacking nodes is of high speed. The destination 
node, D will unicast a RREP to source node S through the route D-N-J-S. The same 
RREQ that arrives later will be ignored by node D. This means, S will choose route 
S-J-N-D to send data to D, and this route passes through the wormhole tunnel 
created by node A1 and A2. 
3.4.5.1.4 Resource consumption attack 
 
The attacker targets to consume the resources of other devices in the network. The 
resources include bandwidth, battery power and computational power which are 
constraint in MANETs. The attacker could overload the network by sending 
unnecessary route requests or excessively sending stale packets to other nodes (Rai 
et al., 2010). This attack is also known as sleep deprivation attack. In AODV 
protocol, the attacker exploits route discovery process. It does not set the timer while 
waiting for the route reply. Instead it exhausts the network by continuously sending 
RREQ packets as shown in Figure 3.7. The malicious packets will congest MANET 
links and this jamming causes a disruption in gaining access to services of available 
servers in the network.  For example, if N1 in Figure 3.7 denotes a server, then its 
services could be made inaccessible by attacker N3 (Abdelhaq et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 3.7: Resource Consumption Attack (Alani, 2014) 
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3.4.5.1.5 Gray hole attack 
 
Gray hole is a special type of a black hole attack. A malicious node in this attack 
drops the packets selectively (Kanthe et al., 2012). During route discovery process, a 
malicious node pretends to be trustworthy, but thereafter begins to silently drop 
packets. There are three types of gray hole attacks. Firstly, a gray hole may choose 
to discard packets coming from or intended for specific nodes, but forward all 
packets to certain nodes. Secondly, a gray hole may act maliciously for a certain 
period, but later on act just like other normal nodes. The third type is a combination 
of the first two types. A gray hole node may discard packets from specific nodes for 
certain time only, and later on act normally. It is quite challenging to detect these 
types of attack due to this uncertainty (Jhaveri et al., 2010). Figure 3.7 demonstrates 
the operation of gray hole attack. 
 
Figure 3.8: Gray Hole Attack 
In Figure 3.7 (a), initially node M behaves as an ordinary node and forwards all 
packets from source node S to destination node D. After some time as shown in 
Figure 3.7 (b), node M behaves maliciously and starts dropping packets sent by 
source node S to destination node D. 
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3.4.5.1.6 Routing attacks 
  
There are many attacks which can be launched against the routing protocols in order 
to mess up the normal functioning of the network. Such attacks have been briefly 
described below. 
1. Routing Table Overflow: The aim of the attacker is to generate adequate routes so 
as to prevent new routes from being created. The attacker achieves this by creating 
routes to nodes that do not exist. This creation of routes causes routing tables to 
overflow, which would stop creation of entries that correspond to new routes to 
existing nodes. For proactive routing algorithms, routing information is discovered 
even before it is needed, while in the case of reactive algorithms a route is found 
only when it is needed.  
2. Routing Table Poisoning:  If there is a compromised node in the network, it will 
either alter routing updates that have been sent to other authorised nodes or 
generate and send false routing updates. Routing table poisoning may hinder routing 
process in the network, cause congestion in some parts of the network or make 
some portion of the network to be unreachable.  
3. Packet Replication: The attacking node reproduces out-dated packets in the 
network. This replication contributes to the consumption of resources such as 
bandwidth and power which are needed by other nodes, and also confuses the 
routing process in the network. 
4. Route Cache Poisoning:  For on-demand routing protocols, the nodes keep a 
record of recent routes that are known in a route cache. Similar to routing table 
poisoning, a compromised node in the network can alter the entries in the route 
cache to cause confusion. 
5. Rushing Attack: An attacker takes advantage of the route discovery process. 
When a source node broadcasts a RREQ, an attacker that receives this request 
quickly floods it throughout the network before other nodes. By the time other nodes 
that received the same request start to forward the request, it is assumed to be a 
duplicate of the request previously sent by the attacker, and hence the nodes that 
receive the request discard it.  This means the attacker would be an intermediate 
node in all the routes that are discovered by the source node, hence all messages 
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from the source node would not be safe as they pass through the attacker. Rushing 
attacks are very difficult to be detected in ad-hoc wireless networks (Rai et al., 2010; 
Wu, et al., 2007). 
3.4.5.2 Transport layer attacks 
 
Transport layer is responsible for end to end communication services between 
applications in the network. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is the popular 
transport protocol, which is used for connection oriented transmissions. User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) is mostly used in forwarding simple messages between 
applications in the network. Attacks at this layer target the loopholes in the operation 
of these protocols as described below. 
3.4.5.2.1 Session hijacking 
 
The authentication of two communicating parties is done only at the beginning of the 
session so session hijacking attack takes advantage of that. In TCP session 
hijacking, the attacker masquerades as a victim node by using its IP address to find 
the sequence number expected by the target node. The attacker then pretends to be 
the victim node, perform Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the victim and continues 
to have illegal sessions with the target node. Session hijacking over UDP is similar to 
TCP session hijacking but much easier to perform because the attacker does not 
have to determine the sequence numbers expected by target node because UDP is 
connectionless (Wu et al., 2007).   
 
3.4.5.2.2 Synchronization (SYN) Flooding attack 
 
The communication between two nodes using TCP is connection oriented, so a 
three-way handshake is used to create a connection. The three-way handshake 
involves three messages that are exchanged by nodes that want to start a 
communication. The messages help the nodes to alert each other when they are 
ready to start communicating, and to decide on initial sequence numbers for the 
conversation. Figure 3.6 below illustrates a three-way handshake. 
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Figure 3.9: TCP Three-way Handshake 
 
In this type of attack, a malicious node initiates a TCP connection with a victim node, 
but does not complete the handshake to fully open a connection. A malicious node 
repeatedly sends SYN packets to a target node using a fake address. A target node 
responds to each SYN packet by sending SYN acknowledgement (SYN-ACK) 
packet to a malicious node and waits to receive ACK packet that confirms that a 
malicious node has received SYN-ACK packet. A malicious node never sends back 
ACK packet, instead it continues to send SYN packets to the victim node. 
All these half-opened connections are stored in the fixed table of a target node, and 
they could overflow the buffer of the node, denying other legitimate nodes a chance 
to establish a genuine TCP connection with a target node. Usually these stored half-
opened connections are given a certain time frame before they can expire and be 
discarded, so eventually a victim node will recover when pending connections expire. 
Nevertheless, a malicious node can continue sending SYN packets to a victim node 
at a rate faster than the rate at which pending connections expire (Rai et al., 2010). 
 
3.4.5.3 Application layer attacks 
 
The application layer makes sure that communication between application programs 
in the network is effective by making services needed by the application programs 
available. The application layer attacks as described below target user applications. 
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3.4.5.3.1 Repudiation 
 
Repudiation occurs when a node in the network takes part in a communication but 
later on claims that it was not involved in such communication (Wu et al., 2007).  For 
example, a selfish person can carry out a repudiation attack in a commercial system 
by making an online transaction or credit card purchase and later on claim not have 
been involved in those operations (Rai et al., 2010). 
 
3.4.5.4 Multi-layer attacks 
 
There are some attacks that are not firmly related to any specific layer in the network 
protocol stack, and they are referred to as multi-layer attacks. The popular multi-
layer attacks are Denial of Service and impersonation. 
3.4.5.4.1 Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
 
Denial of service is an attack whose aim is to deny access to some system 
resources and thereby deteriorate the performance of the network in delivering the 
expected functions.  There are different ways that can be used to carry out a DoS 
attack, but the classical way is to use flooding mechanism in order to overflow the 
network resources so that the network crashes. For instance, during route discovery 
process, a malicious node may overflow the network by continuously sending 
unnecessary route requests to deny other nodes the opportunity to make use of the 
available network resources (Li & Joshi, 2008). The attack scenarios targets are 
storage, processing resources, bandwidth, battery power of the service provider 
(Kanthe et al., 2012). Some types of the DoS attacks are explained below. 
3.4.5.4.1.1 Distributed DoS attack 
 
In this attack, many attackers spread over the whole network, cooperate and cause 
available network resources to be inaccessible to genuine users. This attack is 
therefore the most intense type of DoS attack (Rai et al., 2010).  
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3.4.5.4.1.2 Jamming attack 
 
The attacker monitors the wireless network to obtain the frequency rate at which the 
receiver communicates. The attacker then uses the same frequency as the receiver 
to send data in order to disrupt the operation of the receiver (Mishra et al., 2010). 
3.4.5.4.2 Impersonation 
 
A malicious node joins the network, pretends to be a trusted node of the network and 
begins to maliciously send misleading routing information. Since the attacking node 
has disguised itself to be legitimate, it gets permission to access the network 
management system. It can then alter the system configurations to benefit itself with 
special rights (Patel & Sharma, 2013). Sybil attack is a well-known impersonation 
attack in which a malicious node behaves as if it were a large number of nodes by 
impersonating other nodes or simply claiming false identities (Mishra et al., 2010). 
3.4.6 Modification Attack 
 
The attacker illegally alters the contents of the routing messages and the routing 
process gets messed up. The attack can be performed by altering the route 
sequence numbers and by changing the hop count in order to prompt attacks such 
as black hole attack (Pervaiz, et al., 2010). These attacks include deletion, insertion, 
or alteration of information in an unauthorised manner usually represented to the 
client as legitimate (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.10: Modification attack (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012) 
Figure 3.7 above shows a malicious node (1) that may spread messages to other 
nodes in the network with false claims on the length of a route. It redirects traffic in 
the part of the network on the route between (a) and (f) nodes by propagating  
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messages with false values claiming that the route between (a) and (f) going through 
it, (1), is shorter than claimed by node (b). In this manner the traffic is rerouted 
through the attacking node (1) that enables taking over the session, listening to 
traffic, creating communication delay and provoke energy expenditure in the 
network. 
3.4.7 Fabrication Attack 
 
A malicious node interrupts the operation of the network or consumes resources 
available to other nodes by creating fake route error messages and routing updates 
(Pervaiz et al., 2010). Some of the best known fabrication attacks are black hole, 
gray hole and wormhole attacks (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.11: Fabrication attack (Mladenović & Jovanović, 2012) 
 
 Figure 3.8 above shows a situation where node (e) has a route to (f) through nodes 
(c), (a), (b) and (d). The malicious node (1) can undertake an attack (DoS) on node 
(f) by constantly sending route error messages to (a), thus discrediting node (b) with 
information that connection between (b) and (f) has been interrupted. Node (a) 
receives false route error messages, accepts they came from node (b) and as a 
consequence deletes its own routes table entry for node (f) and forwards route error 
message to (c) that also updates its route tables. Node (1) can constantly listen to 
the connection and each time, upon recognising the request of node (a) to establish 
a connection with node (f), can broadcast spoofed route error message and this 
prevents communication between these two nodes in the network.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 
Security is a very crucial issue in all kinds of communications. This chapter looked at 
the security aspects of MANETs. It firstly explained the characteristics of MANETs 
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that cause them to be more susceptible to attacks than the traditional wired 
networks. Moreover, the chapter explained the attributes that must be fulfilled by the 
network in order to conclude that it is secure. 
 
Attacks against MANETs can be classified as active or passive, internal or external, 
fabrication, modification or impersonation and can also be classified according to the 
layer of occurrence. The different classifications are explained in this chapter and 
each of the attacks is discussed. The next chapter focuses on explaining black hole 
attack which is the type of attack addressed in this study. 
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4  Black Hole Attack 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 gave a brief discussion of each of the security issues in MANETs, and 
black hole attack being one of the issues, was also briefly discussed. This chapter 
gives a detailed explanation of black hole, clearly explaining the types of black hole 
attacks in both AODV and DSR networks. The chapter then looks at some of the 
solutions previously suggested to reduce the impact of black hole attack, and lastly 
discusses previous research work related to this study. 
4.2 Overview of Black Hole Attack 
 
Black hole attack is one of the harmful attacks caused by a malicious node that 
misbehaves in a network. This malicious node is referred to as a black hole (Vani & 
Rao, 2011). A malicious node exploits the process of discovering routes in reactive 
routing protocols. When a source node broadcasts a route request, a malicious node 
misleads other nodes by claiming to have the shortest and freshest route to 
destination. It achieves this by sending false route replies, attracting data packets to 
be routed through it and just discarding them instead of forwarding. This is similar to 
how a black hole in the universe behaves (Raj & Swadas, 2009). 
The messages in ad-hoc network are divided into routing messages and data 
messages (Zapata & Asokan, 2002). One type of black hole attack targets the actual 
data traffic by deliberately discarding, delaying or changing the contents of data 
traffic. To alleviate this type of attack, a promiscuous mode1 of each node is set so 
that each node can watch the neighbouring node to see if it transmits data traffic as 
expected (Sun et al., 2003). 
Another type of black hole attack occurs when a malicious node attacks routing 
control messages; once a malicious node receives a RREQ from nearby nodes, it 
sends a forged RREP message claiming to have a fresh and short route to the 
destination. The data packets that are sent to the destination will therefore pass 
through a malicious node which will absorb them (Sharma & Sharma, 2012) .  
                                                        
1 Mode in which a node on the network accepts all packets, regardless of their destination address 
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It becomes challenging to detect black holes if they use sequence numbers that are 
in the same range with sequence numbers that are being utilised currently in the 
network (Sharma & Sharma, 2012).  For TCP communication which is connection-
oriented, a source node eventually discovers a malicious behaviour because there 
will not be any acknowledgements received from the destination, so the source node 
will use a different route. For UDP communication which is connection-less, it is very 
difficult to detect a black hole because there will not be any acknowledgements 
messages expected (Thachil & Shet, 2012). 
The presence of a malicious node interrupts communication between mobile nodes, 
because it absorbs all traffic from the source node. When the black hole is in 
possession of the data packets, it can perform a DoS attack by dropping the packets 
or intercepting the packets. Confidentiality of the message is also not preserved 
when there is a black hole attack (Vani & Rao, 2011) . According to Sharma and 
Sharma (2012), a network overhead is increased in the presence of a black hole 
attack, the energy of the nodes in the network gets exhausted thereby reducing the 
network’s lifetime and ultimately the network is destroyed. Black hole attack is very 
harmful because the data being discarded by malicious node may include critical 
data of the network. 
 
4.3 Types of Black Hole Attack 
 
In MANET, black hole attacks can be classified into single black hole attack and co-
operative black hole attack (Tseng et al., 2011). 
Single black hole attack: There is only one malicious node attack on the route. 
 
Figure 4.1: Single Black Hole Attack 
Figure 4.1 shows a route from source node, S to destination node, D and there is 
only one malicious node, M. 
Co-operative black hole attack: Malicious nodes act in a group. Figure 4.2 shows 
two malicious nodes, M1 and M2 working co-operatively to attack the network. 
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Figure 4.2: Co-operative Black Hole Attack 
The black hole attack can also be classified into two categories based on the cause 
of the attack as follows (Sharma & Gupta, 2009): 
i.  Black hole attack caused by RREP 
ii.  Black hole attack caused by RREQ 
 
Black hole attack caused by RREP 
 
For black hole attack caused by RREP, when a source node initiates the route 
discovery process by broadcasting a route request, a malicious node misleads other 
nodes by pretending to have an updated route to destination that is shortest and 
freshest (Vani & Rao, 2011). The black hole sends a forged RREP message 
pretending to have a fresh and short path to the destination. This means the black 
hole always returns a positive RREP even when it has no valid route to the 
destination. The data packets that are transmitted to the destination will therefore 
pass through a malicious node which will silently absorb or discard them (Sharma & 
Sharma, 2012). Figure 4.3 illustrates black hole attack caused by RREP. 
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Figure 4.3:  RREP Black Hole Attack 
• Source node, S needs to transmit messages to destination node, D and it has no 
fresh enough path to D, so it broadcasts RREQ to discover the route. 
• Upon receiving a RREQ packet, a malicious node, M immediately responds with 
the highest sequence number RREP, claiming to have a fresh route to D. Malicious 
node, M is advantaged because it replies without searching for the route in its routing 
table. 
• Since a RREP sent by M has the highest sequence number, S will take a route 
from M and send data packets to M for forwarding. M will absorb all the packets and 
discard them. 
 
Black hole attack caused by RREQ 
For black hole attack caused by RREQ, a black hole sends a forged RREQ message 
to attack a target node in the network. This black hole pretends to be rebroadcasting 
the RREQ packet that originated from a target node in the network. It then adds itself 
as the next hop in the route record, so the entire messages destined to the target 
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node will pass through it and it will discard the messages (Sharma & Gupta, 2009). 
Figure 4.4 illustrates black hole attack caused by RREQ. 
 
Figure 4.4: RREQ Black Hole Attack 
• A malicious node 1 forges a RREQ packet for a path to destination node 7. The 
RREQ packet appears to have been created by 6 and forwarded by node 1 which 
adds itself as next hop in the route record. 
• The intermediate nodes 2, 3 and 4 receive the fake RREQ packet and updates their 
route caches with false routing information because the RREQ packet is given a high 
sequence number to mislead them. 
• All data packets intended for node 6 will be forwarded to node 1 with the trust that 
node 1 will pass them to node 6. Instead of forwarding the data packets, node 1 
launches a black hole attack by discarding or absorbing the packets. 
• The similar malicious operation done to node 6 is performed on node 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
If this malicious behaviour is repeated time after time, all other nodes will be misled 
into believing that the route that passes through node 1 is the best to all other nodes. 
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4.6 Mitigation Techniques for Black hole attack 
 
This section describes some of the techniques that were suggested by researchers 
to mitigate the black hole attack. The solutions have been tested using the base 
protocol AODV; however these solutions can be applicable to other reactive routing 
protocols such as DSR (Weerasinghe & Fu, 2007). 
4.6.1 Detection, Prevention and Reactive AODV (DPRAODV) 
 
Raj (2009) proposed DPRAODV. In this scheme, AODV protocol is modified to have 
a new control packet called ALARM and a threshold value. A threshold value is the 
average of the difference of destination sequence number in the routing table and 
sequence number in the RREP packet. 
In the usual operation of AODV, the value of sequence number is checked in the 
routing table by the node that receives a RREP packet. The sequence number of 
RREP packet has to be higher than the sequence number value in the routing table 
in order for RREP to be accepted. In DPRAODV, there is an extra threshold value 
that is compared to RREP sequence number, and if RREP sequence number is 
greater than the threshold value, then the sender is considered malicious and added 
to the black list. The neighbouring nodes are notified using an ALARM packet so that 
the RREP packet from the malicious node is not processed and gets blocked. 
Automatically, the threshold value gets updated using the data collected in the time 
interval. This updating of the threshold value helps to detect and stop black hole 
attacks. 
The ALARM packet contains the black list that has a malicious node, so that the 
neighbouring nodes reject any RREP packet from a malicious node. Any node that 
receives a RREP packet checks the black list and if the reply comes from a node 
that has been blacklisted, it is ignored and further replies from that node will be 
discarded. Thus the ALARM packet isolates a malicious node from the network.  
 
4.6.2 Intrusion Detection System AODV (IDSAODV) 
 
Suryawanshi and Tamhankar (2012) proposed IDSAODV in order to decrease the 
impact of black hole. This is achieved by altering the way normal AODV updates the 
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routing process. The routing update process is modified by adding a procedure to 
disregard the route that is established first.  
The tactic applied in this method is that the network that is attacked has many RREP 
packets from various paths, so is assumed that the first RREP packet is generated 
by a malicious node.  The assumption is based on the fact that a black hole node 
does not look up into its routing table before sending a RREP packet. Therefore, to 
avoid updating routing table with wrong route entry, the first RREP is ignored.    
This method improves packet delivery but it has limitations that; the first RREP can 
be received from an intermediate node that has an updated route to the destination 
node, or if RREP message from a malicious node can arrive second at the source 
node, the method is not able to detect the attack. 
4.6.3 Enhanced AODV (EAODV) 
 
Ahmad et al. (2011) proposed EAODV. Similar to IDSAODV, EAODV allows 
numerous RREPs from various paths to lighten the effect of black hole attack. This 
method makes an assumption that eventually the actual destination node will send a 
RREP message, so the source node overlooks all previous RREP entries, including 
the ones from malicious node and takes the latest RREP packet.    
The source node keeps on updating its routing table with RREPs being received until 
a RREP from the actual destination is received. Then all RREPs get analysed and 
suspicious nodes are detected and isolated from the network. The limitation to this 
method is that it adds two processes that increase delay and exhaust energy of the 
nodes. 
4.6.4 Secure AODV (SAODV) 
 
Lu et al. (2009) proposed a secure routing protocol SAODV that addresses black 
hole attack in AODV. The difference between AODV and SAODV is that in SAODV, 
there are random numbers that are used to verify the destination node.  An extra 
verification packet is introduced in the route discovery process. After receiving a 
RREP packet, the source node stores it in the routing table and immediately sends a 
verification packet using reverse route of received RREP. The verification packet 
contains a random number generated by source node. 
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When two or more verification packets from the source node are received at the 
destination node, coming from different routes, the destination node stores them in 
its routing table and checks whether the contents contain the same random 
numbers. If the verification packets contain same random numbers along different 
paths, the destination node sends verification confirm packet to the source node 
which contains random number generated by destination node. 
If verification confirm packet contains different random numbers, the source node will 
wait until at least two or more verification confirm packets contain same random 
numbers. When the source node receives two or more verification confirm packet 
with same random numbers, it will use the shortest route to send data to the 
destination node. The security mechanism in this protocol is that malicious node 
cannot pretend to be destination node and send correct verification confirm packet to 
the source node. 
4.6.5 Solution using Packet Sequence Number 
 
In the regular operation of AODV, the source node compares the value of RREP 
sequence number with sequence number in its routing table. The RREP packet is 
accepted only if its sequence number has a value higher than the sequence number 
in source’s routing table.   
According to Vani and Rao (2011), RREP sequence number is also compared to the 
threshold value to solve black hole problem. This threshold value gets updated after 
every time interval.  Any node that sends a RREP packet with a sequence number 
greater than the threshold value is alleged to be malicious and is blacklisted. Sharma 
and Sharma (2012) propose that two additional small tables need to be added to 
every node. The sequence number for the last packet sent by a node is to be 
recorded in one table and another table should record the sequence number for last 
packet received from every node. Every time a packet is received or sent by a node, 
the tables are updated.  
During route discovery process, the source node broadcasts a RREQ packet to 
nearby nodes. The destination node or the intermediate node that has a fresh route 
to the destination will reply to the sender with RREP packet that contains the last 
packet sequence number received from the source node. The source node will 
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therefore verify that the sequence number of RREP received matches the record it 
has in the table, and if it does not, the RREP packet is suspected to be from a 
malicious node. Since the sequence number is already part of communication in the 
base protocol, this solution does not increase overhead to the transmission channel. 
It makes it easy to recognise a suspicious reply.  
 
4.6.6 Solution utilizing network redundancy  
 
This is an improvement of the normal AODV. The solution proposes that the source 
node does not immediately start sending data packets after receiving a route reply. It 
waits to receive other route replies from nearby nodes to confirm that they contain 
the same next hop information. This solution uses an assumption that there are 
redundant routes that can be used to reach the destination node. When a RREP 
packet arrives at the source node, the full path is extracted and the source node 
waits for another RREP packet. The routes from other RREP packets are compared 
with the route extracted from the first RREP, and they must have shared hops. If 
there are no shared hops in the routes, the source node takes the routes to be 
untrustworthy and waits for more RREP packets until there are shared hops or until 
the expiration of the routing timer. Even though this solution assures a safe route, it 
increases the time delay and messages will never be forwarded to the destination 
node if there are no shared hops in the paths (Sharma & Sharma, 2012).    
4.7 Related Works 
 
This section surveys some of the related work that has been published in the 
literature. 
Mohebi et al. (2013) analysed the performance of AODV and DSR routing protocols 
when attacked by black hole. In their work, they simulated AODV and DSR when 
there is no attack and when attacked by co-operative black hole using OPNET 
simulation tool. Network throughput, end-to-end delay and network load have been 
used as metrics to analyse the performance of the network. The scenarios that they 
used aimed to reveal how the protocols perform when the number of mobile nodes 
and the number of black hole nodes are varied. The results they obtained show that 
under normal operation, MANET performs better than MANET that is attacked by co-
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operative black hole. Also, the results show that DSR is not the best protocol to use 
in a huge network that has many mobile nodes because its performance deteriorates 
in such environment. 
Dadhania and Patel (2013) evaluated the performance of AODV and DSR in the 
presence of black hole attack and without black hole attack. Experiments have been 
conducted using NS-2 simulator. Performance metrics considered for evaluation are 
throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay. Based on their research and 
analysis, they have drawn a conclusion that AODV is more vulnerable to black hole 
attack. 
Gill and Kunwar (2014) focused on comparative analysis of AODV and TORA routing 
protocols when the network is under black hole attack. NS-2 simulator is used to 
make simulations. The analysis is done using end-to-end delay, throughput, network 
load, packets received, packets dropped, and routing overload as performance 
metrics. The simulation results show that in the presence of black hole attack, TORA 
performs much better than AODV. 
Singh and Singh, (2013) analysed the three routing protocols, AODV, OLSR and 
ZRP in the presence of black hole attack. The simulations were undertaken using 
NS-2 and the analysis was done using performance parameters such as average 
end-to-end delay, throughput and packet delivery ratio. The conclusion drawn from 
their study is that when the network is attacked by black hole, OLSR and ZRP 
perform better than AODV. 
Bala et al. (2009) simulated the black hole attack on AODV using NS-2. The 
simulation results show packet loss, throughput and end-to-end delay with black hole 
and without black hole. The analysis show that packet loss increases in a network 
with black hole node. Throughput and end-to-end delay decrease in the network with 
black hole attack. 
 
4.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the black hole attack in detail. Firstly, it gave a general 
overview of the attack, discussing the different types of this attack and explaining 
how it affects the operation of the network. The black hole in the network can deprive 
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traffic from the source node and disrupt communication. The chapter continued to 
give illustrations of how the black hole attack caused by RREP and black hole attack 
caused by RREQ can occur in AODV and DSR networks. Since the black hole node 
in the network always responds positively with a RREP message even though it 
does not have a valid route to destination, there are several methods that have been 
previously proposed to eliminate this behaviour, and the chapter lastly discussed 
previous work related to this study and some of the mitigation techniques that were 
tested using AODV protocol. Implementation and simulation environment are 
presented in the next chapter.
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5 Implementation and Simulation 
Environment 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study evaluated the black hole attack impact on performance of MANET using   
AODV and DSR protocols. It further compared the performance of AODV and DSR 
under black hole attack. The solutions that have been previously proposed to combat 
effects of black hole attack, which were tested using the base protocol AODV, were 
studied and the study tries to determine the solution that performs better than others. 
This is achieved by using network simulator version 2 (NS-2) to simulate MANET 
scenarios that include black hole node (Fall & Varadhan, 2005).  
It can be very expensive to carry out a networking research by setting up an actual 
network with several computers and routers. Network simulators save a lot of money 
and time in accomplishing network research goals that is why a simulator-based 
approach has been chosen for this study. The disadvantage of simulation is that 
some factors have to be estimated because it is not possible to accurately duplicate 
the whole world inside a computer model. Thus simulation over simplifies real 
network scenarios. There exists a variety of network simulation tools that are used in 
research, but NS-2 has been selected for this study because the protocols under 
study (AODV and DSR) have already been implemented in NS-2. Also NS-2 is 
distributed freely and is an open source environment which allows the creation of 
new protocols, and modification of existing ones, so it is possible to introduce a black 
hole attack in NS-2 by modifying its source code. Moreover, NS-2 is well 
documented and user online support is provided (Pan & Jain, 2008). 
This chapter explains NS-2 and the implementation of the research study on NS-2 
simulation tool stipulating in detail the parameters used in the simulation and 
outlining the changes made to the NS-2 source code to introduce black hole attack. 
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5.2 Network Simulator - 2 (NS-2) 
 
NS-2 is an object-oriented discrete event driven network simulator which was 
originally developed at University of California-Berkely. This means that NS-2 starts 
packet sending at time specified and stops at time specified. It implements a variety 
of protocols such as TCP and UDP, traffic source behaviour such as FTP, Telnet 
and CBR, queue management mechanisms such as Drop tail and routing algorithms 
(Chung & Claypool, 2002). 
 
NS-2 can be used to simulate both local area networks and wide area networks. 
Since it is designed specifically for research in communications networks, new 
protocols, mobility models, amendments to existing protocols are regularly 
contributed by various research communities and it is due to its modularity and 
extensibility that it has gained popularity in research studies (Issariyakul & Hossain, 
2012).  
 
NS-2 uses two programming languages; C++ and OTcl (Tcl script language with 
object-oriented extensions). C++  is  used  for  the  backend  that  runs  the  actual  
simulation, whereas OTcl is used as a front-end (user interface). The reason for two 
languages is because of the structures of these languages; C++ can be used 
proficiently to design and implement a network, but it does not have a visual and 
graphical representation. On the other hand, OTcl is graphical and descriptive and 
can therefore be easily used to revise and alter different parameters. 
Since OTcl is an interpreted language, changes to its code do not require 
compilation. On the  other  hand,  C++  needs  compilation  after  changes to  the  
source  code  for  linking  and producing an executable file. Therefore, OTcl is much 
quicker to change but takes longer to run as interpretations have to be performed 
during run time. However, C++ runs very quickly during runtime but takes longer to 
change since compilation is required. Thus, with advantages of both languages, NS-
2 reaps the benefits offered by C++ and OTcl. 
For efficiency, the route for control data and the route for the actual traffic data are 
implemented separately in NS-2. C++ is used to write and compile the event 
scheduler and the basic network objects. The OTcl script is used to start the event 
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scheduler which guides the source node as to when to begin and end traffic data 
transmission, and to setup network topology (Chung & Claypool, 2002). 
 
 Figure 5.1: NS-2 Schema (Chung & Claypool, 2002)  
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the user writes an OTcl script and NS-2 interprets the script. 
From the interpretation, two analysis reports are created at the same time.  The 
reports are created in the form of files by NS-2. One of the reports is a NAM 
(Network Animator) file that displays the graphical representation of the simulation.  
The other report is a trace file that shows all the actions of the objects in the 
simulation.  
 
Trace file is a log of all events that occur during simulation. From trace file, further 
analysis can be performed with the help of tools such as PERL and AWK to extract 
events that are relevant to the result being investigated (e.g., end-to-end delay). 
NAM tool is essential as it provides a graphical representation of the events in the 
trace file to better conceptualize the series of events that occur during simulations. 
However, NAM does not support graphical representations for wireless simulations.  
 
5.3 Implementation on NS-2 
 
This section explains how simulation of black hole attack was achieved. 
5.3.1 Simulation overview 
 
The two routing protocols AODV and DSR were simulated under normal operation 
and in the presence of black hole using NS-2.35. The simulator scenarios aim to 
show the performance of AODV and DSR when there is no attack and in the 
presence of black hole attack, using different number of mobile nodes, different 
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speeds and different traffic load. Therefore two simulations were used for each 
protocol, in the first scenario, a black hole node was not included and in the second 
scenario, a black hole node was added. 
A typical simulation with NS-2 basically consists of creating the input files as shown 
in Figure 5.2 below: 
i. Scenario file that describes position and  movement pattern of the nodes 
ii. Communication file that describes connection and  traffic in the network 
 
Figure 5.2: NS-2 Simulation Processes 
 
The scenario file gives precise information about the movement of each node, the 
packets created by each node, and the time at which each change in movement or 
packet creation is to happen. Each run of simulation produces a detailed trace file 
that shows events happening during simulation such as number of packets delivered 
successfully, routes taken by packets, and extra information about internal operation 
of scripts executed.  This data is further analysed with AWK file and Microsoft Excel 
to produce the graphs. 
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5.3.2 Simulation Parameters 
 
The random way point model is used to create the mobility scenarios. Random way 
point model which utilises ‘setdest’ utility.  ‘setdest’ is a third party application of NS 
found in the directory; …/ns-2.35/indep-utils/cmu-scen-gen/setdest. It randomly 
creates positions of the nodes in the network using the stated speed and pause time. 
Random way point mobility stipulates that after some time interval a node moves 
with a random speed towards a destination node that it selects randomly. The node 
pauses for a certain time at the destination, and randomly selects another 
destination. The node repeats this process till the end of simulation. The connection 
patterns are generated by ‘cbrgen’ utility, the third party application of NS which is 
found in the directory; …/ns-2.35/indep-utils/cmu-scen-gen/cbrgen.tcl. The utility 
generates connections randomly chosen from nodes in the network.  
In this study, the simulations are done on a square area of 670m X 670m. The total 
number of nodes ranges from 20 to 100 and the nodes move at the maximum speed 
ranging from 20m/s to 80m/s. The packets are transmitted at the rate of 4 packets/ 
sec. Each simulation instance lasts for 500 seconds. The model utilised as a 
wireless transmission channel at the physical layer is two ray ground propagation. 
The algorithm that is utilised at the data link layer is IEEE 802.11. AODV and DSR 
are used as a network layer routing protocols. 
The transport layer protocol that is employed is User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and 
the generated data packets are constant bit rate (CBR). The size of the packets is 
512 bytes. UDP protocol is used because it is connectionless so the source node 
does not notice when there is no connection between itself and the destination node. 
It continues to send the packets even when there is a malicious node discarding 
them. If Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) was used, the source node would stop 
sending the packets if it does not get acknowledgement packet from the destination 
node. Therefore, since UDP connection is not lost during simulation it is easy to 
accurately count the number of packets sent and received.  If TCP protocol had been 
used, sent and received packets could not be counted because the source node 
closes the connection if it does not receive an acknowledgement packet from the 
destination after some time. 
Chapter 5 : Implementation and Simulation Environment 
 
65 
Figure 5.3 below shows a snapshot of the wireless node configuration parameters 
used. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Wireless Node Configurations 
For consistency, the same mobility model and connection pattern is used throughout 
the simulations. 
 
5.3.3 Simulation of black hole attack 
 
A malicious node is introduced to both AODV and DSR to implement a black hole by 
modifying NS-2 C++ source code as shown below. A malicious node attracts the 
packets and discards them. 
5.3.3.1 AODV Modifications 
i. Declared malicious node variable in aodv.h file. 
bool malicious; 
ii. Initialized the variable to false in aodv.cc constructor function to 
show that initially all nodes are not malicious. 
malicious= false; 
iii. In AODV.cc the following code was added to command function 
to detect which node is malicious. 
                                         if(strcmp(argv[1], "hacker") == 0) {  
                               malicious = true;  
                              return TCL_OK;  
                           }  
iv. In AODV.cc route handling function, the following code was 
added to maliciously drop packets. 
                                    // if I am malicious node  
                                    if (malicious == true) {  
                                    if (cmh->ptype() == PT_CBR) {            
                                    drop(packet, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP);  
                                    return;//Required if you get pkt flow not specified error.  
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                                    // DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP is added for no reason.  
                                    }  
                                    }  
 
5.3.3.2 DSR Modifications 
 
i. Declared malicious node variable in DSRagent.h file. 
bool malicious; 
 
ii. Initialized the variable to false in DSRagent.cc constructor 
function to show that initially all nodes are not malicious. 
malicious= false; 
 
iii. In DSRagent.cc the following code was added to command 
function to detect which node is malicious. 
 
 
                                         if(strcmp(argv[1], "hacker") == 0) {  
                               malicious = true;  
                              return TCL_OK;  
                              }  
iv. In DSRagent.cc handleFlowForwading function, the following 
code was added to maliciously drop packets. 
                                    // if I am malicious node  
                                    if (malicious == true) {  
                                    if (cmh->ptype() == PT_CBR) {            
                                    drop(packet, DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP);  
                                    return;//Required if you get pkt flow not specified error.  
                                    // DROP_RTR_ROUTE_LOOP is added for no reason.  
                                    }  
                                    }  
 
 
5.3.3.3 Recompiling NS-2 
 
After modifying the existing NS2 algorithm to incorporate the black hole behaviour, 
NS-2 has to be recompiled by using the “Make” command.  There are three make 
files in the directory NS-2.35/ns-2.35; Makefile.vc, Makefile.in and Makefile, but 
modifications are made at the Makefile.in. The following commands have to be 
executed; 
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· make clean 
· make depend 
· make 
 
5.4 Evaluation of Simulation 
 
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 show snapshot captured by NAM during simulation. As it 
has already been explained in Section 5.2, NAM provides a graphical representation 
of the simulation. For clarity, the snapshot illustrates only a sample of seven mobile 
nodes in a network. The source node is denoted by an orange node 0, the 
destination node is denoted by a purple node 3, and the malicious node is 
represented by a red node 5. Figure 5.4 demonstrates a simulation in an 
environment with no attack, and the destination node receives data packets sent by 
the source. Figure 5.5 demonstrates a network environment with a black hole node 
absorbing data packets from the source node instead of forwarding them to the 
destination node. 
  
 
Figure 5.4: Connection between node 0 and node 3 correctly established 
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Figure 5.5: Node 5 (black hole) absorbs the packets 
 
5.5 Summary 
 
This chapter has discussed the implementation and simulation environment of the 
study. It first explained NS-2 simulation framework and highlighted its capabilities 
and why it is the mostly used tool for research. It further discussed the simulation 
parameters that were used on NS-2 to achieve the objectives of the research, also 
highlighting on the modifications that were done on the NS-2 AODV and DSR source 
code to introduce the black hole attack. 
The next chapter presents the performance results and analysis of the results 
obtained from NS-2 simulations. 
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6  Simulation Results and Analysis 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has covered the implementation of the study on NS-2 and the 
simulation environment. This chapter presents evaluation of the results obtained 
from simulations. It begins by describing how results are obtained from NS-2 trace 
files; it then describes the performance metrics used to evaluate the routing 
protocols. The results are then presented and analysed based on the performance 
metrics. The chapter further gives a comparison of black hole attack solutions from 
literature study. 
6.2 Examining the Trace Files 
 
The simulation results are extracted from a trace file. A trace file is a report 
generated by NS that lists all the events that occur during simulations. It records the 
time when packet was sent, the sending node, the receiving node, the kind of packet 
sent, whether the packet was dropped and the reason for dropping. For simulations 
in this study, “wireless trace” file format is used because MANETs are wireless 
networks.  The sample of the new trace file is reflected in Appendix II. 
 
The fields in the trace file are not all required to get results from the trace files, so 
filtering must be done to interpret trace files results. This can be tedious if it is done 
manually. Hence AWK scripting language has been used to process trace files. AWK 
is actually a programming language designed to process text files.  
6.3 Performance Metrics  
 
Various metrics can be used to analyse the performance of the routing protocols in a 
normal network environment and in a malicious environment. The performance of 
AODV and DSR in this study is measured based on throughput, packet delivery ratio 
and end-to-end delay. 
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6.3.1 Throughput 
 
Throughput is the degree at which messages are transmitted successfully over a 
communication channel. It can also be described as the ratio of amount of data 
received from the sender to the total time consumed in transmitting the whole 
message to the destination. Normally throughput is measured using bits per second. 
 
………………………………………………… (1) 
 
where CBRrecv represents number of constant bit rate packets received by 
destination node. 
The main factors that affect throughput are bandwidth, limited energy, change in 
topology and untrusted communication. 
6.3.2 Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) 
 
This is the ratio of the total number of data packets received at the destination to the 
total number of data packets sent at the source.
         
 
 
 
……………………………………………………... (2) 
 
 
where; 
PDR % represents percentage of packet delivery ratio. 
CBRrecv represents number of constant bit rate packets received by destination node. 
CBRsent represents number of constant bit rate packets sent by source node. 
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6.3.3 End-to-end Delay 
 
This is the average time taken from creating a packet at the source node until it is 
received at the destination node, and is expressed in seconds. The general network 
delay caused by buffer queues, routing activities, transmission times, etc. is included 
when calculating end-to-end delay. Different applications need different delay level, 
for instance voice and video transmissions require lesser delay and show little 
tolerance to delay level. 
    
.……. (3) 
 
 
where; 
 Avg End_to_end Delay represents the average time delay taken for message to be 
transmitted from source to destination. 
CBRrecvTime represents time at which constant bit rate packet reaches the destination. 
CBRsentTime represents time at which constant bit rate packet is sent by source node. 
 
6.4 Simulation Results 
 
The consequences of black hole attacks are shown by using graphs. The graphs are 
obtained from the output results of AWK scripts. The performance metrics explained 
in Section 6.2 are used to analyse the performance of AODV and DSR by changing 
the following parameters in the simulation: 
i. Network Size: Variation in the number of mobile nodes. 
ii. Mobility: Variation in the maximum speed. 
iii. Network Traffic Load: Variation of the load offered to the 
network. 
The graphs present a comparative analysis of the performance metrics of both 
AODV and DSR for different number of nodes, different mobility, and different traffic 
loads. 
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6.4.1 Effect of Network Size  
 
The total number of mobile nodes participating in the network at each simulation 
instance was varied from 20 to 100. The speed at which the nodes move was 
maintained consistently at 20 m/s and a maximum of 10 connections was kept. Since 
the aim is to find the outcome caused by a change in network size, the only variable 
altered was the number of mobile nodes. The network size variations were done in 
both AODV based network and DSR based network. A black hole node was 
introduced in each network type. The graphs in this section plot throughput, packet 
delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay against the number of mobile nodes in the 
network. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Throughput AODV vs. DSR 
 
The simulation results of Figure 6.1 show that the rising number of mobile nodes 
does not cause a significant change in throughput. DSR’s throughput is a little higher 
than AODV’s throughput because DSR at all times searches for the most freshest 
and available route. Again, it is observed from the results that throughput for both 
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protocols decreases when the network is attacked by the black hole because some 
of the packets are absorbed by a malicious node so the total number of packets 
received at the destination is reduced. DSR under black hole attack performs better 
than AODV under black hole attack because of the source routing nature of DSR. It 
does not have to entirely depend on the routing table of intermediate nodes during 
the route discovery process. 
 
Figure 6.2: Packet Delivery Ratio AODV vs. DSR 
 
The results of Figure 6.2 show that increasing the number of mobile nodes in the 
network does not bring significant change to packet delivery ratio for both AODV and 
DSR. The ratio remains approximately 100%. Also from the results, it is observed 
that packet delivery ratio for DSR is slightly higher than that of AODV.  
This is because DSR works more efficiently when the size of the network is small, so 
the maximum number of nodes in all network scenarios in the study is 100. In the 
presence of black hole attack, packet delivery ratio is reduced. This is due to the fact 
that some packets are discarded by malicious node during the attack. DSR performs 
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better than AODV when the black hole attack is launched against the network. 
Packet delivery ratio of AODV reduces to a very low level in the presence of black 
hole attack. 
 
Figure 6.3: End-to-end Delay AODV vs. DSR 
 
From Figure 6.3, it is observed that increasing the number of nodes in the network 
increases end-to-end delay. This is caused by the increasing number of 
neighbouring nodes.  The simulation results also reveal that DSR’s delay is greater 
than AODV’s delay. This is because DSR is a source routing protocol, so the source 
node carries a large overhead because it keeps a complete record of route from 
source to destination, including the intermediate nodes, hence the high delay. Unlike 
DSR, AODV does not keep a complete route record. End-to-end delay decreases 
when there is a black hole attack because the malicious node does not have to 
search for the route in the routing table. 
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6.4.2 Effect of Mobility 
 
The maximum speed was changed from 20 m/s to 80 m/s, keeping the total number 
of nodes constant at 20 nodes and maximum of 10 connections. The changes were 
done in both AODV and DSR. The black hole attack was launched in both AODV 
based network and DSR based network. The graphs in this section plot throughput, 
packet delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay against the increase in the mobility of the 
network. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Throughput AODV vs. DSR 
 
The simulation results of Figure 6.4 show that increasing the speed (mobility) of 
nodes in the network does not bring significant change in throughput. For both 
protocols, throughput decreases slightly. This is caused by the rapid change of 
positions of the nodes, which may cause the path to the destination to change while 
some packets have been transmitted from the source node using the old route. 
Therefore the transmitted packets get lost on the way. Throughput of the network 
under black hole attack decreases because of the packets discarded by the 
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malicious node. AODV’s throughput drops drastically compared to DSR’s 
throughput. 
  
Figure 6.5: Packet Delivery Ratio AODV vs. DSR 
 
When the mobility of the nodes is increased packet delivery ratio decreases slightly. 
This is because some of the packets may get lost along the way to the destination 
when the path from the source node to the destination node changes due to rapid 
change of intermediate nodes’ positions. The packet delivery ratio of AODV is very 
low compared to that of DSR when the black hole attack has been launched against 
the network. 
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Figure 6.6: End-to-end Delay AODV vs. DSR 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that end-to-end delay decreases with increase in speed because 
the nodes move more frequently, and the routing updates are exchanged more 
frequently. When there is a black hole attack, end-to-end delay gets even lower 
because the malicious node pretends to have a valid route to the destination without 
checking in the routing table, so the route discovery process takes a shorter time. 
 
6.4.3 Effect of Network Traffic Load 
 
The traffic connections between the nodes were varied from 2 to 6, keeping the total 
number of nodes constant at 20 nodes and maximum speed constant at 20 m/s. The 
simulations were done on AODV based network and DSR based network, and the 
black hole attack was launched to each network. The graphs in this section plot 
throughput, packet delivery ratio, and end-to-end delay against the increase in traffic 
load of the network. 
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Figure 6.7: Throughput AODV vs. DSR 
As traffic load increases, throughput for both protocols is increased because they are 
on demand protocols and establish routes only when needed, therefore increasing 
the load does not affect the good performance of the protocols. The performance 
degrades when the black hole attack is launched; this is because of the reduction in 
the number of packets that are received at the destination. The performance of 
AODV decreases more than that of DSR when there is an attack.  
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Figure 6.8: Packet Delivery Ratio AODV vs. DSR 
Packet delivery ratio decreases slightly when the number of connections is 
increased. This is because as traffic increases, packets lost will also increase 
because the bandwidth requirements of the network are increased. When there is a 
black hole attack, the number of packets lost increases for both protocols; hence 
packet delivery ratio also decreases. The decrease is more drastic in AODV than in 
DSR. 
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Figure 6.9: End-to-end Delay AODV vs. DSR 
End-to-end delay is increased for both protocols as traffic load increases because 
the network gets overloaded and requires more bandwidth, so transmission rate is 
reduced. In the presence of a malicious node, end-to-end delay is reduced because 
the malicious node shortens the route discovery process time by responding with a 
positive RREP without looking for the route in the routing table.  
 
6.5 Comparison of Black Hole Attack Mitigation Techniques 
 
The following table compares the four mitigation techniques against black hole attack 
that have been discussed in Section 4.6, so that a conclusion can be drawn as to 
which technique best removes black hole attack in the network. Results in the table 
have been extracted from published papers proposing the discussed black hole 
attack solutions. 
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Table 2: Black hole attack solutions 
Technique Results Impact on network 
 
 
DPRAODV 
PDR is improved by 80 to 
85% than AODV under 
attack 
§ Increase in routing 
overhead 
§ Minimum increase in 
end-to-end delay 
 
 
IDSAODV 
PDR  is improved by 73.26 
% than AODV under attack 
§ No additional 
overhead 
§ No modification in 
packet format 
 
EAODV 
PDR is improved by 70 % 
than AODV under attack 
§ Offers no overhead 
 
 
 
 
SAODV 
PDR is improved by 
approximately 100% than 
AODV under attack 
(Effectively prevent black 
hole attack) 
§ Maintains high 
routing efficiency 
§ Brings burden of 
having to store 
RREP and 
verification confirm 
packet in each route 
discovery phase 
 
Table 2 compares the four black hole attack solutions that have been previously 
proposed and tested in the literature. The comparison shows their efficiency in 
removing the black hole attack and the impact they bring to the network.  
 
As far as efficiency to remove black hole attack is concerned, the solutions can be 
arranged as follows, in terms of preference from best to worst performance. 
1. SAODV 
2. DPRAODV 
3. IDSAODV 
4. EAODV 
SAODV is considered the best because it is believed to effectively (≈100%) prevent 
black hole attack. 
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When considering the solution that does not bring any negative impact to the 
network, the solutions can be arranged as follows, in preference order. 
1. IDSAODV 
2. EAODV 
3. SAODV 
4. DPRAODV 
IDSAODV is considered the best because it brings no additional overhead. EAODV 
also does not bring any overhead, but its efficiency to remove black hole attack is 
lower than that of IDSAODV. 
6.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided results from simulations using NS-2 and results from 
literature study. The results have been presented by the use of graphs, comparing 
the performance of AODV and DSR both under normal operation and when the 
network is attacked by black hole. It further presented the analysis of the results and 
the analysis has been done based on throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-
end delay as performance metrics. The comparison of the black hole mitigation 
techniques was also analysed. 
 
From the results using the mentioned metrics, it has been observed that black hole 
attack deteriorates the performance of MANETs and it is also observed that AODV is 
more vulnerable to black hole attack than DSR. The next chapter gives the 
concluding remarks of the study and recommendations for future study. 
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7 Conclusion and Future Work 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
 
MANETs are useful in situations where it is not possible to setup a network structure, 
but they are prone to many security attacks due to features like freedom of nodes to 
move and lack of infrastructure. It is therefore very crucial to provide security for 
these kinds of networks, and it is more challenging to secure the routing process. 
Black hole attack is an attack that aims to disrupt the routing process in MANETs. 
This study evaluated the effect of black hole attack on the overall performance of 
MANETS.  In evaluating the effect of black hole attack on MANETs, the two popular 
reactive routing protocols, AODV and DSR were compared. The aim of comparing 
the protocols was to discover which protocol performs better when the network is 
attacked by black hole.  The study also compared some of the mitigation techniques 
that have been proposed to eliminate black hole attack so that the best black hole 
solution can be discovered.  
 
To attain the objectives of the study, NS-2 simulator was used to set up AODV and 
DSR networks. Firstly both protocols were simulated in a network that is not 
attacked, and then the protocols were simulated in a network where black hole 
attack has been launched. The performance metrics that were used to perform the 
evaluation are throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay. To compare 
black hole attack solutions, the background literature of four mitigation techniques, 
DPRAODV, IDSAODV, EAODV, and SAODV was studied. 
 
The observation derived from simulations is that when the network is attacked by a 
black hole, its performance degrades. This is revealed by the reduction in 
throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end delay in the network that is under 
attack.  The decrease in end-to-end delay might be considered to be an advantage, 
but it is only caused by the fact that during black hole attack, a malicious node does 
not search its routing table when it receives a RREQ, instead it pretends to have a 
fresh enough route to the destination and sends RREP.    
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A sample of mobile network with 50 nodes is considered to analyse the rate at which 
the performance metrics are affected by the black hole attack. In an AODV network, 
all the three performance metrics; throughput, packet delivery ratio and end-to-end 
delay are reduced by approximately 97% when the network is under black hole 
attack. In a DSR network, both throughput and packet delivery ratio are reduced by 
approximately 30% and end-to-end delay is reduced by 44%. This analysis is 
illustrated by Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Impact of Black hole on network with 50 nodes 
Performance Metrics AODV (% Decrease) DSR (% Decrease) 
Throughput 97.0% 29% 
Packet Delivery Ratio 97.1% 29.6% 
End-to-end Delay 96.6% 44.0% 
 
The above statistics leads to a conclusion that the effect of black hole attack in an 
AODV network is more pronounced than in a DSR network. Therefore, DSR is most 
suitable than AODV for networks that experience regular black hole attacks.  
 
After studying and comparing the mitigation techniques, it can be concluded that 
SAODV removes black hole attack more effectively than other techniques though it 
brings the burden of extra storage to the network. This implies that when considering 
effectiveness of preventing black hole SAODV is the best solution. When considering 
the solution that does not disrupt the normal operation of the network, it can be 
concluded that IDSAODV is the best solution as it does not bring any additional 
overhead to the network. Even though many solutions have been proposed to 
combat the effects of black hole attack, it has been realised that all solutions have 
some drawbacks, and are not totally efficient. 
 
7.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
 
This study has analysed the black hole attack effect on AODV based MANET and 
DSR based MANET, there is need to analyse the impact of this attack using other 
MANET routing protocols in future, so that the best routing protocol for minimising 
impact of black hole attack may be determined. 
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Also, there are several attacks that can be launched against MANETs, but this study 
has only focused on black hole attack. It is important to conduct a research on other 
types of attacks such as; wormhole, gray hole, and byzantine and their impact be 
compared to black hole attack’s impact. This will assist in classifying the attacks 
based on their level of impact on the performance of MANETs. 
 
Random way point mobility model was used to generate scenarios in this study, but 
there are several other mobility models which can be used in future to study 
behaviour of routing protocols when different models are used. The performance 
metrics that have been used in this study are throughput, packet delivery ratio an 
end- to-end delay, other performance metrics can be used in future to determine how 
they are affected by the black hole attack. 
 
Again only four black hole attack mitigation techniques were studied and compared 
in this study. There are several other techniques that have been proposed and 
tested which can also be included in the comparison so that the best of all the 
techniques can be derived. Furthermore, the security algorithm against black hole 
attack can be proposed and implemented as an improvement to the already existing 
algorithms. 
7.3 Summary 
 
This chapter briefly gave the background literature of the study. The aim of the study 
was then described by giving the objectives. The chapter further described how the 
study was carried out to meet the objectives. The observations derived from the 
results were presented and the chapter stipulated the conclusions based on the 
results. Lastly, the recommendations for future research were outlined. 
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9 Appendices 
Appendix I: TCL Simulation Script 
 
Below is a TCL script for simulating wireless network with 20 mobile nodes. 
 
# MANETAODV.tcl 
#=============================================================== 
# Define options 
#=============================================================== 
set val(chan)       Channel/WirelessChannel 
set val(prop)       Propagation/TwoRayGround 
set val(netif)      Phy/WirelessPhy 
set val(mac)        Mac/802_11 
set val(ifq)        Queue/DropTail/PriQueue 
set val(ll)         LL 
set val(ant)        Antenna/OmniAntenna 
set val(x)              670  ;# X dimension of the topography 
set val(y)              670  ;# Y dimension of the topography 
set val(ifqlen)         50   ;# max packet in ifq 
set val(seed)           0.0 
set val(adhocRouting)   AODV 
set val(nn)             20    ;# how many nodes are simulated 
set val(cp)             "../mobility/scene/Connections"  
set val(sc)             "../mobility/scene/scen-20-test"  
set val(stop)           500.0   ;# simulation time 
 
#=============================================================== 
# Main Program 
#=============================================================== 
# Initialize Global Variables 
# create simulator instance 
set ns_  [new Simulator] 
$ns_ use-scheduler Heap 
 
# setup topography object 
set topo [new Topography] 
 
# create trace object for ns and nam 
set tracefd [open wireless1-out.tr w] 
set namtrace    [open wireless1-out.nam w] 
$ns_ trace-all $tracefd 
$ns_ namtrace-all-wireless $namtrace $val(x) $val(y) 
 
# define topology 
$topo load_flatgrid $val(x) $val(y) 
 
# Create God 
set god_ [create-god $val(nn)] 
 
# define how node should be created 
#global node setting 
 
$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(adhocRouting) \ 
Appendices 
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                 -llType $val(ll) \ 
                 -macType $val(mac) \ 
                 -ifqType $val(ifq) \ 
                 -ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \ 
                 -antType $val(ant) \ 
                 -propType $val(prop) \ 
                 -phyType $val(netif) \ 
                 -channelType $val(chan) \ 
   -topoInstance $topo \ 
   -agentTrace ON \ 
                 -routerTrace OFF \ 
                 -macTrace OFF  
 
# Configure physical layer 
#create nodes receiving range 250m, carrier sensing range  
#500m 
#Phy/WirelessPhy set CPThresh_ 10.0 
#Phy/WirelessPhy set CSThresh_ 9.21756e-11 ;#550m 
#Phy/WirelessPhy set RXThresh_ 4.4613e-10 ;#250m 
 
# Create the specified number of nodes [$val(nn)] and "attach" them 
to the channel.  
 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
 set node_($i) [$ns_ node]  
 $node_($i) random-motion 0  ;# disable random motion 
} 
 
# Define node movement model 
puts "Loading connection pattern..." 
source $val(cp) 
 
# Define traffic model 
puts "Loading scenario file..." 
source $val(sc) 
 
# Define node initial position in nam 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn)} {incr i} { 
 
# 20 defines the node size in nam 
# the function must be called after mobility model is defined 
        $ns_ initial_node_pos $node_($i) 20 
} 
 
#Adding a malicious node 
$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(5) set ragent_] hacker" 
#$ns_ at 0.0 "[$node_(23) set ragent_] hacker" 
 
# Tell nodes when the simulation ends 
proc finish {} { 
    global ns_ tracefile namfile 
    $ns flush-trace 
    close $tracefile 
    close $namfile 
    exec nam blackhole.nam & 
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    exit 0 
} 
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} { 
    $ns_ at $val(stop).0 "$node_($i) reset"; 
} 
$ns_ at $val(stop) "$ns_ nam-end-wireless $val(stop)" 
$ns_ at  $val(stop).0002 "puts \"NS EXITING...\" ; $ns_ halt" 
 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 nn $val(nn) x $val(x) y $val(y) rp 
$val(adhocRouting)" 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 sc $val(sc) cp $val(cp) seed $val(seed)" 
puts $tracefd "M 0.0 prop $val(prop) ant $val(ant)" 
 
puts "Starting Simulation..." 
#$defaultRNG seed  0 
$ns_ run 
Appendix II: Sample of New Trace File 
 
r 1.019151540 _3_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 48 [0 ffffffff 6 800] ------- 
[6:255 -1:255 27 0] [0x2 4 1 [3 0] [0 4]] (REQUEST) 
r 1.019151540 _2_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 48 [0 ffffffff 6 800] ------- 
[6:255 -1:255 27 0] [0x2 4 1 [3 0] [0 4]] (REQUEST) 
r 1.019151571 _5_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 48 [0 ffffffff 6 800] ------- 
[6:255 -1:255 27 0] [0x2 4 1 [3 0] [0 4]] (REQUEST) 
r 1.023470126 _1_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 44 [13a 1 2 800] ------- [5:255 
0:255 29 1] [0x4 2 [3 4] 10.000000] (REPLY) 
f 1.023470126 _1_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 44 [13a 1 2 800] ------- [5:255 
0:255 28 0] [0x4 3 [3 4] 10.000000] (REPLY) 
r 1.029001792 _0_ RTR  --- 0 AODV 44 [13a 0 1 800] ------- [5:255 
0:255 28 0] [0x4 3 [3 4] 10.000000] (REPLY) 
s 1.029001792 _0_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [0 0 0 0] ------- [0:0 3:0 30 
1] [0] 0 0 
r 1.038747793 _1_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [13a 1 0 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
30 1] [0] 1 0 
f 1.038747793 _1_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [13a 1 0 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
29 2] [0] 1 0 
r 1.048633793 _2_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [13a 2 1 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
29 2] [0] 2 0 
f 1.048633793 _2_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [13a 2 1 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
28 5] [0] 2 0 
r 1.058398920 _5_ RTR  --- 0 cbr 1020 [13a 5 2 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
28 5] [0] 3 0 
D 1.058398920 _5_ RTR LOOP 0 cbr 1020 [13a 5 2 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
27 5] [0] 3 0 
s 1.080000000 _0_ AGT  --- 1 cbr 1000 [0 0 0 0] ------- [0:0 3:0 32 
0] [1] 0 0 
r 1.080000000 _0_ RTR  --- 1  cbr 1000 [0 0 0 0] ------- [0:0 3:0 32 
0] [1] 0 0 
s 1.080000000 _0_ RTR  --- 1 cbr 1020 [0 0 0 0] ------- [0:0 3:0 30 
1] [1] 0 0 
r 1.089602000 _1_ RTR  --- 1 cbr 1020 [13a 1 0 800] ------- [0:0 3:0 
30 1] [1] 1 0 
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Appendix III: Accompanying CD-ROM 
 
· Dissertation Soft Copy 
Ø The soft copy of the dissertation is located in the dissertation folder. 
· Software 
Ø The source code that is used for implementation is located in the software 
folder and the NS-2 files that have been modified to implement the black 
hole attack are found in the following directories. 
 
~software/nsallinone-2.35/ns2.35/Aodv/Aodv.cc 
~ software/nsallinone-2.35/ns2.35/Aodv/Aodv.h 
~ software/nsallinone-2.35/ns2.35/dsr/dsr.cc 
~ software/nsallinone-2.35/ns2.35/dsr/dsr.h 
· Simulation Scripts 
Ø The TCL scripts and AWK scripts that have been used in simulations are 
stored in the simulations scripts folder.  In ns-2.35 software, these scripts 
have been located in the directory below. 
~software/nsallinone-2.35/ns2.35/tcl/mobility/ 
· Simulation Manual 
Ø The manual that explains how the simulation scripts are run to get the 
results is located in the manual folder. 
· Results 
Ø All Microsoft Excel files displaying the results that are used in the results 
and analysis of the dissertation are stored in the results folder. 
